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LEGAL MALPRACTICE: THE LOCALITY RULE AND
OTHER LIMITATIONS OF THE STANDARD OF CARE:
SHOULD RURAL AND METROPOLITAN LAWYERS
BE HELD TO THE SAME STANDARD
OF CARE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers, like other professionals, are considered to have more
knowledge and skill in their discipline than ordinary individuals
and therefore have a duty to exercise a higher minimum standard
of care in their practice.1 A breach of this duty is enforcable under
the common law tort concept of negligence.2 Lawyers, however,
can also be sued for malpractice and held liable for breach of an
implied contractual duty to their client.3 When an attorney
"hangs out his shingle" and accepts a case, he or she impliedly rep-
resents to the client that: (1) he or she is as knowledgeable, skilled,
and able to practice law as a similarly situated member of his or
her profession; (2) his or her best judgment will be used in repre-
senting the client; and (3) he or she will exercise reasonable care
and diligence in applying his or her special skills and knowledge to
the client's case.4 Both the tort and contract theories establish a
minimum level of conduct, which courts usually refer to as the
standard of care.5 Failure to meet this minimal level of skill and
care is grounds for a malpractice action and, correspondingly, lia-
bility for any damages suffered by the client.6
Courts rarely put much weight on the distinction between
tort and contract theories in legal malpractice cases except to dis-
tinguish statutes of limitation.7 Under both negligence and con-
1. See, e.g. Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147,._, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864,865-66 (1961)
(defendant attorneys found negligent for failure to advise plaintiffs that chattel mortgage
ought to be recorded).
2. ABA/BNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 301:101 (1984)
[hereinafter LAWYERS' MANUAL] (one of the most common theories for liability in
malpractice cases is negligence).
3. Id. (a second common theory for liability in malpractice cases is for breach of
contract).
4. Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 519-20, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1954) (defendant
attorney did not breach his implied contractual duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary
care in applying his skill and knowledge to his client's case).
5. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 250, at 315 (2nd ed. 1981) (the most
common forms of attorney malpractice concern professional negligence or breach of
implied contract).
6. Id. (the standard of care is the basis for determining an attorney's liability in
malpractice actions).
7. See, e.g., Harrison v. Casto, 165 W.Va. 787, -, 271 S.E.2d 774, 776 (1980). The
plaintiff in Harrison retained the defendant attorney to sue another attorney for
malpractice. Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 775. However, the defendant attorney failed to bring
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tract theories, courts have required that a plaintiff be in privity of
contract with the defendant attorney to have standing to bring
suit, unless the intent was for the plaintiff to be a third party bene-
ficiary.' This barrier is slowly being broken down by the courts
and being replaced with a foreseeability standard.9 Regardless of
which theory is asserted, lawyers are not perfect and will not be
held strictly liable for every mistake made in the course of
practice. '
Some courts have added an additional element to the lawyers'
standard of care to allow for differences in available resources and
local customs in various communities." This element is often
termed the "locality rule" and first appeared in America in medi-
cal malpractice cases.' 2 The locality rule served to prevent rural
doctors from being held-to the same standard of care as city doc-
tors, who were presumed to be more skilled and presumed to pos-
sess better equipment."3 If the locality rule is applied to a legal
malpractice case, an attorney is required to possess only the skill
and diligence ordinarily possessed by other attorneys in the local-
ity or community.' 4 For the purpose of this Note, the definition of
locality may at times be broader than merely the town or city
where the lawyer practices. 15
the malpractice suit within the two year statute of limitations for tort actions. Id. at __ 271
S.E.2d at 775. Consequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant for malpractice. Id. at -, 271
S.E.2d at 775. The case was dismissed by the trial court and the dismissal was affirmed on
appeal by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 775. The
supreme court of appeals held that there was no malpractice because the plaintiff still had a
viable breach of contract action against the first attorney because the six year breach of
contract statute of limitations had not yet run. Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 776.
8. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at 71:1101-06.
9. See generally, Note, Attorney's Liability to Third Parties for Malpractice: The
Growing Acceptance of Liability in the Absence of Privity, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 48, 71 (1981).
Rather than use the fallacious and ancient privity requirement to insulate attorneys from
liability to third parties, the Note asserts that legal malpractice cases should be analyzed on
a case by case basis, focusing on whether reliance by and injury to the third party was
foreseeable. Id.
10. See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199 (1879) (attorneys must exercise a
reasonable degree of care, prudence, diligence, and skill, but "attorneys do not profess to
know all the law or to be incapable of error or mistake.").
11. For a general discussion of the locality rule, see infra notes 39-88 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the locality rule as applied to legal malpractice, see
infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text.
12. See infra riotes 44-57.
13. Id.
14. Note, The Locality Rule in Legal Malpractice Litigation: An Inappropriate
Method of Defining the Required Standard of Care, 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 395, 399
(1986). See infra notes 39-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of the
locality rule.
15. See, R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 335-36. The authors explain
the variations among the courts in defining "locality":
In selecting a geographical limitation on the standard of care, the courts
have run the gamut of possible boundaries. Some courts have referred to the
While a locality rule may protect rural practitioners from
unrealistic standards, it may also disadvantage plaintiffs in prose-
cuting a malpractice case.1 6 Most courts either allow or require
expert testimony at trial to establish the appropriate standard of
care, unless the attorney's lack of care and skill is so obvious that
the trier of fact can find negligence as a matter of common knowl-
edge. 7 A locality rule may serve to limit expert testimony to
those experts practicing law in the locality where the alleged
injury occurred. As in the medical profession, lawyers are often
reluctant to testify against fellow practitioners. Therefore, the
plaintiff in a legal malpractice case may suffer a disadvantage if a
locality rule fosters a "conspiracy of silence.""' Furthermore,
pockets of incompetence could develop as a result of the locality
rule. Since expert witnesses must often be drawn from the locality
in which the alleged misconduct occurred, it is plausible that the
whole population of lawyers in that locality could possess sub-par
skills and methods in certain fields of the law (for example, securi-
ties, patent, and other highly specialized fields). It would be natu-
ral for expert witnesses drawn from such a pool to testify that the
skill level common to that locality was adequate. Therefore, it is
conceivable that an unacceptably low standard of care could be
established for a particular locality. Persons seeking quality legal
assistance in that locality would then be at a disadvantage.' 9
Lawyers have a duty to provide competent service to their
clients, and if unable to do so, they have a corresponding duty to
practice "in the same area" or "place." The standard has been applied in the
context of the "community or locality." More commonly, the key word is
"locality." Selection of locality appears to often confuse the courts. The
description of the locality varies widely: the "particular locality," the "lawyer's
locality," or more commonly, the "same or similar locality." A frequent
characterization of the geographical area is the county in which the lawyer
practiced. The most logical and commonly stated territorial selection, however,
is that of the state.
Id. (citations omitted). Generally, however, locality refers to the community in which the
defendant lawyer practices. Id. at 332. This Note examines all the geographical elements
added by courts to limit the standard of care.
16. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text for discussion of the "conspiracy of
silence" which is sometimes encountered by a plaintiff in a professional malpractice action.
17. See generally, Annotation, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to
Standards of Practice and Negligence in Malpractice Action Against Attorney, 14 A.L.R.
4th 170, 173 (1982) (general rule is that expert evidence is required in legal malpractice
cases to establish the standard of care, unless the breach is so obvious that it is within the
knowledge and experience of laymen).
18. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "conspiracy of
silence" sometimes associated with professional malpractice actions.
19. See infra note 125 and accompanying text for a discussion of why incompetent
attorneys cannot be allowed to set the requisite standard of care.
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refuse service.20 "To be competent, a lawyer must have the knowl-
edge, skill, and experience necessary for the type of case accepted,
and must also execute the case diligently and efficiently. 21 Compe-
tence is important to a discussion of the locality rule and its deriva-
tives because the norm of competence of lawyers practicing
within each community may vary with the makeup of its mem-
bers. 2 Inclusion of a geographical limitation in the standard of
care is legal recognition of this phenomenon.
Recently, commentators have noticed a dramatic increase in
the number of malpractice claims. 23 The American Bar Associa-
20. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-3 (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]. The ethical consideration provides:
[A] lawyer generally should not accept employment in any area of law in which
he is not qualified. However, he may accept such employment if in good faith he
expects to become qualified through study and investigation, as long as such
preparation would not result in unreasonable delay or expense to his client.
Id. The corresponding Disciplinary Rule of the Model Code provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not
competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is
competent to handle it.
Id. at DR 6-101(AX1). A corresponding section of the Model Rules provides:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1984) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
The relevant portion of the comment to Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules provides:
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to
handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar .... Some
important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evi-
dence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most
fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a
situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular special-
ized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly
novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be pro-
vided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field
in question.
MODEL RULES Rule 1.1 comment (1984).
21. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 252, at 318 ("elements of competence
most commonly cited are skill, knowledge, care, diligence and capacity"). The American
Law Institute and the American Bar Association (ALI-ABA) define competence as follows:
Legal competence is measured by the extent to which an attorney (1) is
specifically knowledgeable about the fields of law in which he or she practices,
(2) performs the techniques of such practice with skill, (3) manages such practice
efficiently, (4) identifies issues beyond his or her competence relevant to the
matter undertaken, bringing these to the client's attention, (5) properly prepares
and carries through the matter undertaken, and (6) is intellectually, emotionally,
and physically capable.
ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON- CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, A MODEL PEER
REVIEW SYSTEM § 1, at 11 (1980) (Discussion Draft) [hereinafter PEER REVIEW SYSTEM].
22. PEER REVIEW SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 11. ("[a]s with the law itself, standards of
competence will vary among communities and over time, reflecting differences in
experience, values, and available resources.").
23. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 6, at 18 (the 1970s produced four times
as many legal malpractice appellate decisions as the 1960s, and almost as many reported
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tion and other organizations have assembled committees to study
and devise solutions to this problem. 4 These groups of reformers
seek to find methods other than judicial enforcement to enhance
the competence of lawyers.2 5 Such methods may serve to enhance
the quality of service to the public and reduce the amount of mal-
practice claims made against lawyers. The non-judicial remedies
may also improve the competence of rural lawyers by providing
better resources and opportunities. However, it has been sug-
gested that many legal malpractice suits are not the result of
incompetence or negligence, but rather poor client relations.
26
An alternative to judicial enforcement of the standard of care
by a private malpractice action exists under both the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 7 Violation of the Model provisions on competence can
legal malpractice decisions as were produced in the entire history of American
jurisprudence); LAWYERS' MANUAL supra note 2, at 301:105 (1984) (same); ABA STANDING
COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE 1-
2 (1986) [hereinafter PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE] (premiums for lawyers'
professional liability insurance are increasing and availability of coverage is decreasing);
ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, THE REPORT ON THE
HOUSTON CONFERENCE: ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS 223 (1981)
[hereinafter HOUSTON CONFERENCE] (there is great troublesome growth of legal
malpractice).
24. Committees which have been formed to study the malpractice trend include the
ABA Task Force on Professional Competence, the ALI-ABA Committee on Continuing
Professional Education, and the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional
Liability.
25. PEER REVIEW SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 3. The reporter for the Peer Review
System stated:
[L]aw practice peer review... [is] among many kinds of reforms suggested to
deal with the problem of attorney incompetence. Among others are:
(1) improved legal education;
(2) improved bar admission screening;
(3) certification of legal specialists;
(4) programs of continuing legal education, mandatory or voluntary;
(5) education of the public better to recognize and avoid the incompetent
pracer [sic]; and
(6) governmental regulation of the legal profession.
Id.
26. See HOUSTON CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 40-41. One of the participants at the
conference stated:
[T]he most important thing in the relationship between a lawyer and client
is how the lawyer treats the client, not the kind of results the client gets nor the
competency of the lawyer.
Clients are inclined to evaluate lawyers on that personal relationship and
not have the capacity to tell how good they are.
Id. at 40, 41.
27. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at 01:3. The following states have adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct or an amended Model Code which incorporates the
substance of the Model Rules: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. States often
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be enforced through disciplinary proceedings.2" Neither the
Model Rules nor the Model Code, however, are intended to be
used as the basis for imposition of civil liability.29 Whereas a civil
malpractice action is primarily compensatory, disciplinary sanc-
tions promote competence by deterrence.30 Disciplinary proceed-
ings, however, may not be effective to enforce competency. Two
main reasons support this theory. First, formal complaints by fel-
low practitioners are rare and complaints by clients usually result
in civil proceedings for damages. 31 Second, the disciplinary sys-
tem was designed to deal with intentional misconduct, whereas
incompetency is more often a case of negligence. 32 Therefore, dis-
ciplinary proceedings may not have a significant impact on raising
the level of competency.
The issue this Note seeks to address is whether geographical
limitations within the standard of care for lawyers serves the best
interests of the legal profession and society. Part II of this Note
modify the Model provisions to fit the particular preferences of each state. Id. at 01:11.
The balance of the states probably have a version of the Model Code.
28. See MODEL RULES, supra note 20, at Preamble (1984); MODEL CODE, supra note
20, at Preliminary Statement (1980). For the pertinent provisions of the Model Rules and
the Model Code, see supra note 20. Failure to comply with the minimum standards set
forth by the Model Rules or the Model Code "is a basis for invoking the disciplinary
process." Id. at 01:103. The disciplinary proceedings are to be conducted in light of the
facts and circumstances of the lawyer's conduct at the time in question. LAWYERS'
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 01:103, 01:302.
The purpose and nature of disciplinary proceedings are set forth in the ABA MODEL
STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS 1.1, 1.2 (1983)
[hereinafter STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE]. The STANDARDS FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINE place responsibility in the highest court of each state to organize and
administrate the disciplinary system. Id. at 2.1. The STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE
also calls for the creation of a disciplinary agency consisting of a board, hearing committees,
counsel, and staff. Id. at 3.3. Furthermore, the STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE
enumerates grounds for discipline and sanctions. Id. at 5.1, 6.1.
29. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at 01:104, 01:302; see also Martinson Bros. v.
Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D. 1985) (Code of Professional Responsibility is not to be
used to define standards for civil liability, but a violation of the Code is rebuttable evidence
of legal malpractice); Clay, Application of the Model Rules to Legal Malpractice, 1
COMPLEAT LAWYER 37, 39-40 (Summer 1984) (ALI-ABA definition of competence is
subjective, and therefore not suitable as a standard of care for lawyers in civil actions).
30. See In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 1970) (disciplinary proceedings are
neither civil nor criminal in nature, but result from the inherent power which the court has
over its officers); LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at 101:2101 ("purpose of disciplinary
proceedings is not to punish the respondent lawyer, but rather to maintain appropriate
professional standards in order to protect the public and the administration of justice").
31. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 333 (local practitioners are
extremely reluctant to testify against fellow attorneys).
32. See HOUSTON CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 244. The ALI-ABA commentator
explained as follows:
First, the disciplinary system was designed and created to deal primarily
with intentional misconduct. An incompetent lawyer, virtually by definition, is a
lawyer who does something wrong because he or she doesn't know any
better .... Incompetence, then, is anything but intentional misconduct.
666
1988] NOTE 667
therefore describes the development and evolution of the locality
rule."3 Part III explores the premises and presumptions underly-
ing the various standards that may have geographical limitations.
3 4
Part III also examines the modern trend of comparing the stan-
dard of care for general practitioners to the standard of care for
specialists, rather than comparing the rural practice to the urban
practice.35 Part IV of this Note then utilizes North Dakota as a
.working model to demonstrate how various versions of the stan-
dard of care affect the legal profession and society.36  North
Dakota is a rural state, yet contains three standard metropolitan
statistical areas.3 7 Therefore, because of North Dakota's contrast-
ing needs, it is a useful model for this analysis.3 8
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOCALITY RULE
The locality rule is an element included by some courts in
establishing a standard of care for professionals.39 The rule was
developed by the courts to protect professionals located in small,
rural communities from being held to the same standard of care as
their metropolitan counterparts.40 Jurisdictions applying the local-
ity rule hold a professional to the level of excellence exercised by
an ordinary professional in the locality or community where the
particular professional practices.4 1 Therefore, the standard of care
may vary according to the norm set by similar professionals work-
ing in the same area. 42 Furthermore, a locality rule may also serve
33. See infra notes 39-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history and
development of the locality rule.
34. See infra notes 89-196 and accompanying text for a discussion of various
geographical limitations which are utilized in the standards of care of other jurisdictions.
35. See infra notes 197-238 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
specialist/generalist variation for a standard of care.
36. See infra notes 244-348 and accompanying text for an analysis of variations of the
standard of care as applied to North Dakota.
37. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 244-268 and accompanying text for a discussion of the profile of the
North Dakota legal profession.
39. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 332. For further discussion of the
locality rule, see infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g.I Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, -, 349 A.2d
245, 249 (1975) (rationale for the locality rule based upon the, inequalities between
physicians practicing in large urban areas and those practicing in remote rural areas).
41. J. ELWELL, A MEDIcO-LEGAL TREATISE ON MALPRACTICE, MEDICAL EVIDENCE,
AND INSANITY 22-23 (4th ed. 1881) (difficult to determine what constitutes ordinary skill for
a professional because it may vary within the same state or country).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g (1965). The comment gives
a rationale for a standard of care that varies according to the locality of practice:
Such allowance for the type of community is most frequently made in
professions or trades where there is a considerable degree of variation in the skill
and knowledge possessed by those practicing it in different localities. It has
commonly been made in the cases of physicians or surgeons, because of the
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:661
to require lawyers to be familiar with the local rules and customs
which also may differ between communities.43
The American version of the locality rule was, until recently,
associated more closely with the medical profession.4 4 Cases and
commentary in the late 19th century started a trend in America of
applying the locality rule to medical malpractice cases. 45 The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court has applied the same standard of care,
which includes a locality rule, to both physicians and lawyers,
stating:
(1) Both are required to use that degree of care, skill
and diligence which is commonly possessed and exercised
by attorneys/physicians in that locality.
(2) Neither is an insurer or guarantor of results
which will be attained.
(3) Unsuccessful results do not give rise to a pre-
sumption of negligence.
difference in the medical skill commonly found in different parts of the United
States, or in different types of communities.
Id.
43. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334.
44. See J. ELWELL, supra note 41, at 22. Section 299A, comment g of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts states that a locality rule is rarely included in the standard of care for
lawyers because variations in skill level between different localities are minimal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g (1965).
45. Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46, 62-64 (1870), reprinted in 6 Kan. 33, 42-43 (1884) (2d ed.
annot.); see also Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286, 289-90 (1872) ("standard of ordinary skill
may vary even in the same state, according to the greater or lesser opportunities afforded
by the locality"); Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880) ("physician in a small country
village does not make a specialty of surgery, and.. would have but few opportunities of
observation and practice in that line such as public hospitals or large cities would afford")
(overruled by Brune v. Bielinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, __, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968)). The
Kansas Supreme Court in Tefft borrowed much of its rationale for distinguishing between
rural and metropolitan doctors from a medical malpractice treatise. Tefft, 6 Kan. at 62-64,
reprinted in 6 Kan. at 42-43 (2d ed. annot.). SeeJ. ELWELL, supra note 41, at 22-23. In this
treatise, the author explains why rural and metropolitan doctors may be held to different
standards of care:
There are many neighborhoods, in the West especially, where medical aid is
of difficult attainment; yet cases of disease and surgery are constantly occurring,
and they must, of necessity, fall into the hands of those who have given to the
subject but little, if any thought. Thus the inexperienced and the unlearned
attend to the surgery in their way, or it is not attended to at all .... In these cases,
no more.. should be expected of the operator than the exercise of his best skill
and judgment, however limited that might be.
In the smaller towns and country, those who practice medicine and
surgery.. do not enjoy so great opportunities of daily observation, and practical
operations.. as those have who reside in the metropolitan towns ... and... they
should not be expected to exercise that high degree of skill and practical
knowledge possessed by those having greater facilities for performing and




(4) Both are liable only for negligent failure to use
the requisite care and skill.46
Typically, courts do not apply the same rule to both doctors and
lawyers because the professions are in some ways dissimilar.4 7
Nevertheless, the Mississippi formulation outlines the essential ele-
ments of a standard of care which includes a locality rule. 48
The locality rule was applied in medical malpractice cases to
take into consideration differing skill, resource, and opportunity
levels inherent in a society in transition from an agrarian to an
industrial economy.49 Since the development of modern educa-
tion, communications, and transportation, a physician's locality of
practice, however, no longer provides a clear line for measuring
differing levels of skill, opportunity, and resources.5" Therefore, a
standard of care determined by a certified skill level rather than
location is a much more direct and specific method of defining the
standard of care." Nevertheless, a well drafted standard of care
for professionals in general would take into consideration the cir-
cumstances of the particular case, which would include the locality
of practice when relevant.5 2
Today, the locality rule is being abandoned in medical mal-
practice cases,5 3 the reason being that medical standards are now
46. Dean v. Conn, 419 So.2d 148, 150 (Miss. 1982) (emphasis added).
47. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334 ("[u]nlike the medical
field,. . knowledge of local practices, rules, or customs may be determinative of... the
exercise of adequate care and skill").
48. Dean, 419 So.2d at 150. For other examples of the locality rule within the standard
of care for lawyers, see infra note 101.
49. See J. ELWELL, supra note 41, at 22-23.
50. See Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Medical Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, -, 349
A.2d 245, 249 (1975) (application of the strict locality rule for medical malpractice cannot
be reconciled with the realities of the practice of medicine today); Brune v. Bielinkoff, 354
Mass. 102, 352 N.E.2d 793, 796 (1968) ("distinctions based on geography are no longer valid
in view of modern developments in transportation, communication and medical education,
all of which tend to promote a certain degree of standardization within the profession").
51. See Hirschberg v. State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470, 474-75 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1977). The court in Hirschberg abandoned the locality rule for medical malpractice cases
because it was obsolete and was an imprecise method to define the standard of care for
today's physicians. Id. at -, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 474-75. The court stated: "The more
progressive principle adopted in sister states places the emphasis upon professional
proficiency rather than geographical proximity." Id. at -, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 474-75.
52. See, e.g., id. at -. , 398 N.Y.S.2d at 475 ("qualified medical practitioner should be
subject to liability in a malpractice action if he fails to exercise that degree of care and skill
expected of the average practitioner in the class to which he belongs, having regard for the
circumstances under which he must act").
53. Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408, 415 (1969); see also Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency
Medical Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, -, 349 A.2d 245, 249 (1975). The court in Shilkret
offered a possible rationale for the trend toward abandonment of the locality rule in
medical malpractice cases:
Whatever may have justified the strict locality rule fifty or a hundred years
ago, it cannot be reconciled with the realities of medical practice today. "New
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becoming more uniform across the nation. 4 Instead of utilizing
geographical distinctions, the standard of care for the medical pro-
fession is now differentiated by degree of specialization.5 5 There-
fore, a family practitioner doing emergency heart surgery will not
be held to the same standard of care as a heart specialist.5 6 How-
ever, if a general practitioner is not competent to perform the task
and has the opportunity to refer the case to someone who is com-
petent, the generalist has a duty to do so.
57
In legal malpractice cases, the general rule in the United
States has always been that an attorney is liable for lack of such
skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and
capacity commonly possess.58 The minority trend of applying a
locality rule to the standard of care for lawyers began in the 1960s
and early 1970s, 59 about a century after the locality rule began to
techniques and discoveries are available to all doctors within a short period of
time through medical journals, closed circuit television presentations, special
radio networks for doctors, tape recorded digests of medical literature, and
current correspondence courses." More importantly, the quality of medical
school training itself has improved dramatically in the last century .... [T]here
now exists a national accrediting system which has contributed to the
standardization of medical schools throughout the country.
Id. at -, 349 A.2d at 249 (citations omitted); see also Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, -,
295 A.2d 676, 682 (1972) (modern systems of transportation and communication, plus a
proliferation of literature, seminars and post-graduate courses, make it possible for all prac-
titioners to be reasonably familiar with current medical advances).
54. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 8.06, at 8-83 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Shilkret, 276 Md. at -, 349 A.2d at 253 ("physician is under a duty to use
that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in
the same class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances") (emphasis
added).
56. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 3.06.
57. 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 3.07; see Hirschberg v. State, 91
Misc. 2d 590, -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470, 473 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1977) (if practitioner has reason to
doubt his or her competence to handle the case, he or she must consult those more
knowledgeable). The lawyer's duty to refer has also been explicitly stated by several other
jurisdictions. See Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 414, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720
(1979) (lawyers have a duty to refer when they are not competent to handle a given case);
Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Brown, 308 Md. 219, __, 517 A.2d 1111, 1118 (attorney
should have known that he needed to associate a specialist). For a discussion of a lawyer's
duty to refer, see infra notes 329-336 and accompanying text.
58. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879) (attorneys are bound to exercise
a reasonable degree of care, prudence diligence, and skill); Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882, 887
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881) (lawyer must possess ordinary legal knowledge and skill common to
members of the profession); Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542, 552 (1872) ("rule firmly
established in this country by the weight of authority is that an attorney is bound to use
ordinary skill and care in the course of his professional employment"); Caverly v. McOwen,
123 Mass. 574, 576, 578 (1878) (lawyer must possess legal knowledge and exercise diligence
and skill usually possessed and exercised by ordinary lawyers).
59. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, -, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 419 (1968)
(expert evidence in malpractice suit is conclusive as to proof of the prevailing standard of
skill and learning in the locality); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, -,
269 So. 2d 239, 244 (1972) (lawyer's conduct in a malpractice action is judged against other
prudent lawyers practicing in his locality); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) (testimony of an expert that practiced law in a different county than the
defendant was not considered by the court as evidence of negligence because the expert
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be applied in medical malpractice cases."0 This development
began at roughly the same time that courts began to hold that
expert testimony was often "necessary to establish the parameters
of acceptable professional conduct, a significant deviation from
which would constitute malpractice." 1 In 1967, one commenta-
did not have knowledge of the standard of care in the defendant's county). See also Sarti v.
Udall, 91. Ariz. 24, -, 369 P.2d 92, 93 (1962) (standard of care for an attorney is the
reasonable degree of care and skill in the performance of an attorney's duty in light of all
the facts and circumstances of the case); Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, -, 378 S.W.2d 655,
661 (1964) (applied standard of care was to be that which would be exercised by an
ordinarily careful and prudent practitioner in the county under the same or similar
circumstances). Although the trend may have become more prominent in the 1960s and
1970s, as early as the late 18th century, an English court indicated that it may not be fair to
hold rural lawyers to the same standards as their urban colleagues. Pitt v. Yalden, 98 Eng.
Rep. 74, 75 (K.B. 1767). Lord Mansfield in Pitt stated:
The attornies are far from having been guilty of any gross misbehaviour. It
does not appear to me, that they were grossly negligent, or grossly ignorant, or
intentionally blamable: they were country attornies: and might not, and
probably did not know that this point was settled here above. The words of the
Act are not so explicit as to direct them clearly: and they might act innocently.
Therefore we ought not to proceed against them in a summary way.
Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, -, 431 P.2d 973, 978
(1967) (locality rule was never adopted by English courts for medical malpractice cases due
to the small size of the country); HOUSTON CONFERENCE supra note 23, at 53.
60. See supra note 45 for the cases and commentary that began the trend of applying
the locality rule to medical malpractice cases.
The following statement indicates that the legal profession has lagged behind the
medical profession in developing professional standards by several generations and suggests
that courts often follow medical professional developments when formulating new
standards. The Honorable Norman Krivosha, Lincoln, Nebraska, made the following
statements from the Houston Conference floor:
It seems to be that it is unfortunate we have not taken a sufficient lesson
from the medical profession which at the turn of the century concluded that
specialization and residency was the way to develop medical competency. At
the same time, the legal profession concluded that the general practice and
three or four years of law school was adequate.
HOUSTON CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 53.
61. Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849 227 S.E.2d 802, 806 (1976). The following
cases mark the beginning of the trend for courts allowing or requiring expert testimony in
legal malpractice cases to establish the appropriate standard of care. See, Dorf v. Relies, 355
F.2d 488, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1966) (expert testimony is required to make out a prima facie
case against a lawyer for negligence); Sarti, 91 Ariz. at __, 369 P.2d at 94 ("[w]hether
ordinary care and diligence in applying professional skill and learning has been used is a
question for experts and can only be established by their testimony"); Rhine, 238 Ark. at -,
378 S.W.2d at 661-62 (testimony of attorneys held admissable not as proof of conclusions of
law, but rather as evidence of standards of conduct for attorneys in the community in
question); Lysick, 258 Cal. App. 2d at -, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 419 (breach of duty is usually a
question of fact unless it is so obvious that it can be decided as matter of law, and expert
testimony is necessary to determine standard of care in the locality); Cook, 409 S.W.2d at
477-78 (testimony of expert that practiced law in a different county than defendant was not
considered by court as evidence of negligence because the expert did not have knowledge
of the standard of care in the defendant's county). The court in Lysick expressly stated that
until this case, California courts did not require expert testimony to establish the standard
of care in legal malpractice cases, and that it had borrowed the rule requiring expert
testimony to establish the standard of care for lawyers from medical malpractice cases:
This rule has been applied in California to medical malpractice cases, and while
no cases have been found in this state applying the rule to legal malpractice,
there is no reason why the rules of evidence for malpractice against a lawyer
should not be the same as those governing cases against doctors.
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tor noted: "The vast majority of reported cases do not mention
testimony by other attorneys.... 2 However, as early as 1966,
several courts began to require the plaintiff to present expert testi-
mony to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice.6 3
Courts in early American legal malpractice decisions did not
allow the use of expert testimony.64 If the determination of
whether there was a duty and a breach thereof was too complex
for the jury, the judge would characterize the issue as a question of
law, and in effect, serve as the expert witness.6 5 The rationale for
not allowing expert testimony to establish the standard of care was
that it would allow the expert witness to decide an ultimate issue
in the case.66 Under this rule, the judge could take judicial notice
of the circumstances under which the lawyer acted, including spe-
cial characteristics of the locality in which the defendant prac-
ticed.6 ' Therefore, in these early legal malpractice cases, judges
may have in fact applied a locality rule without labeling it as such.
The prevailing view is that both the establishment of the stan-
dard of care for lawyers and the determination of a breach of duty
are issues of fact.68 Expert testimony is often necessary to establish
these two elements because usually neither is a matter of common
knowledge.6 9 The Appellate Court of Illinois stated the rationale
for characterizing the establishment of the standard of care and
the breach thereof as an issue of fact rather than an issue of law as
follows: "A determination made by a trial judge based upon a pri-
Lysick, 258 Cal. App. 2d at -, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 419. But see Evans v. Watrous, 2 Port. 205,
210-11 (Ala. 1835), reprinted in 6 Ala. 66, 68 (annot. ed. 1910) (attorney's negligence is
usually a question of fact for the jury to be determined by evidence of those familiar with
the same kind of business); Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212, 227 (1850), reprinted in 5 Ark.
(Annot. ed. 1888) (liability of attorney for negligence may be determined by evidence of
those who are familiar with the same kind of business); Olson v. North, 276 I11. App. 457,
485 (1934) (submission of hypothetical question to expert witnesses of whether such con-
duct was the same as other lawyers would have pursued under similar circumstances held
proper); Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, -, 18 A. 698, 701 (1889) (expert testimony allowed
in legal malpractice case to aid jury in considering issue of negligence or want of skill).
62. Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L. J. 771, 779 (1967-68).
63. Id. at 780.
64. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 665, at 834-35.
65. Note, supra note 62, at 777.
66. See, e.g., Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542, 549 (1872) (question to expert witness of
whether attorneys' conduct constituted negligence held inadmissable because negligence is
a question of law for the court to decide).
67. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 665, at 842; Cf. Note, supra note 62, at 778
(judge's private knowledge of circumstances is not an adequate substitute for proof through
evidence provided by the parties).
68. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 665, at 837; Note, supra note 62, at 776.
69. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 665, at 837; see, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 258
Cal. App.2d 136,-.., 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 419 (1968) (breach of legal standard of care is usually
an issue of fact and expert testimony is necessary unless breach is obvious, even to a lay
person)
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vate investigation by the court or based upon private knowledge
of the court, untested by cross-examination, or any of the rules of
evidence constitutes a denial of due process of law.'70
Today, courts generally require expert testimony to establish
the standard of care for a lawyer, unless the facts are such that a
layman would have no difficulty in ascertaining the breach of
duty.71 Whether a legal malpractice case is based on a negligence
or contract theory, there are four elements which must be proven
by the plaintiff to establish a compensable claim: 1) a duty; 2) a
breach of the duty; 3) causation; and 4) damages. 72 Expert testi-
mony is useful and often necessary to establish all four elements,
but the most common use of expert testimony in a legal malprac-
tice action is to establish the standard of care.73
When courts characterize a breach of the standard of care as
an issue of fact for a jury, the plaintiff must prove the breach with
evidence, usually in the form of expert testimony by other law-
yers.7 4 When this practice became the norm, it was necessary for
courts to include factors within the standard of care such as the
locality of practice to put both the parties and the jury on notice
that such factors are relevant. 75 Including such factors is impor-
tant because the standard of care is often stated in abstract terms,
yet must be applied to specific facts,7 6 and the fact-finder may
overlook variations that may exist between communities or other
relevant circumstances. 7 A locality rule thus indicates to the trier
of fact that the customary level of skill, knowledge, and experience
among professionals varies among localities.78
Not every malpractice case, however, involves a situation that
70. House v. Maddox, 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 72, 360 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1977) (quoting
People v. Wallenberg, 24 Ill. 2d 350, 354, 181 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1962)).
71. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 665, at 837-38. See, e.g., House, 46 I11. App.
3d at 73, 360 N.E.2d at 584 (expert testimony is not needed when the negligence is
apparent and undisputed).
72. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 657, at 811-13.
73. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 666, at 843.
74. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 665, at 838. The authors illustrated the
important role that expert testimony has in a legal malpractice action by stating: "The
consequence of not producing expert testimony is the failure to prove an essential element
of the cause of action which requires a nonsuit or judgment in favor of the attorney." Id.
75. See Note, supra note 62, at 781. The defendant in a legal malpractice case has a
natural tendency to draw expert witnesses from the local bar, but when the plaintiff has a
duty to present expert testimony to establish a prima facie case, "if locality is to be
considered, it becomes necessary to impose a requirement that testimony.. be given with
reference to the locality in which the defendant practices." Id. (emphasis added).
76. Note, supra note 62, at 775-76 (particularization of the standard of care is of
paramount significance).
77. Note, supra note 62, at 782 (without locality element, court may not consider
differences in resources and opportunities among attorneys in different communities).
78. Note, supra note 62, at 781.
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is affected by the locality of practice."9 Therefore, the application
of the locality rule is fact-specific and will not be an issue in every
case." ° Nonetheless, in appellate opinions where the locality of
practice is not at issue, courts that recognize a locality rule will
often state the standard of care and include a locality rule without
applying it to the facts.8' In such cases, inclusion of a locality ele-
ment is dicta and provides no analytical support for this concept.
8 2
Including a locality element in the standard of care for law-
yers serves to disqualify expert witnesses who are not familiar with
the particular characteristics of practice in the community where
the defendant lawyer practices.8 3 This limiting function of a local-
ity rule protects a defendant lawyer from being held to an unfa-
miliar standard of care established by a foreign expert witness.8 4
On the other hand, inclusion of a locality element within the stan-
dard of care can make it difficult for the plaintiff to retain expert
witnesses because attorneys practicing within the same commu-
nity may be reluctant to testify against their peers.85 Therefore, as
expert testimony becomes more important in legal malpractice
cases, courts will tend to broaden or eliminate geographical limita-
tions to enhance the plaintiff's ability to retain qualified experts
and present a stronger case.8 6
Although the minority trend of applying a locality rule to legal
malpractice cases did not become apparent until the 1960s, lan-
guage in several earlier cases indicated that courts had taken
notice of the locality of practice and other relevant circumstances
all along.87 These cases, however, do not cite to any common
79. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g (1965) (when standards
of profession in different localities are uniform, courts are not required to instruct on the
issue of locality).
80. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, §254, at 337 (it is unnecessary to include
locality in the jury instructions, except to the extent that local considerations are relevant
circumstances).
81. See, e.g., Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., 311 N.W.2d 175, 180-81 (N.D.
1981). In Sheets, the court stated that the standard of care is the degree of skill ordinarily
possessed by lawyers in good standing in similar communities. Id. at 180. In the analysis
that followed, however, no mention was made of the community in which the defendants
practiced. Id. at 180-81.
82. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 332 (references to the locality of
practice without analysis constitutes dictum).
83. Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
84. Id.; see Note, supra note 62, at 781 (locality rule excludes testimony of professionals
who practice in different communities because they are not aware of the environment in
which the defendant acted); Cf., Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, -, 431 P.2d 973,
977 (1967) ("[w]hen there was little intercommunity travel, courts required experts who
testified to the standard of care [for physicians]... to have a personal knowledge of the
practice of physicians in that particular community .... ").
85. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 333.
86. D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2:11 (1980).
87. See Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144, 148 (1849) (skill required has reference to the
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authority, and thus, no trend can be identified.88 Perhaps courts
applied a locality rule without identifying it as such by merely
applying the general rule to all the facts and circumstances of the
case, which would include the locality of practice.
The next section will review cases defining the standard of
care, including those jurisdictions utilizing a basic locality rule as
described above, as well as other jurisdictions which have utilized
various modifications designed to alleviate some of the problems
associated with the locality rule. Like the judicial history in medi-
cal malpractice cases, it appears that legal malpractice precedent
is also coming full circle - first adopting, then abandoning the
locality rule in response to changing conditions.
III. RURAL AND URBAN LAWYERS - THE REQUISITE
STANDARD OF CARE FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. ANALYSIS OF THE LOCALITY RULE AND MODERN
VARIATIONS
The locality rule in its basic form was adopted to protect rural
attorneys from exposure to unrealistic standards of care and to
hold all lawyers responsible for knowledge of local rules and cus-
toms. The basic locality rule served an important purpose during
an era in which both communication and transportation were
slow, and rural lawyers were isolated from the progress occurring
in metropolitan areas. In applying the locality rule to both medi-
cal and legal malpractice cases, courts began to recognize that its
use hampered the use of expert testimony.89 The following discus-
sion illustrates the problems inherent with the basic locality rule
character of the business which he has to do); Hillegass v. Bender, 78 Ind. 225, 227 (1881)
(attorney must be acquainted with the settled rules of law and practice in the courts
prevailing in the locality wherein he practices); Patterson & Wallace v. Frazer, 79 S.W.
1077, 1080 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) (quoting Annotation, Liability of Attorney to Client for
Mistake, 52 L.R.A. 883, 893 (1901)) ("attorney is expected and required to possess such
reasonable skill and diligence in all questions relating to his profession as are recognized by
the profession where he practices law"). The rules announced in the following cases do not
serve to specifically protect rural lawyers from unreasonably high standards, but rather to
hold all lawyers to be well-acquainted with the local rules and practice where he or she
practices. Gabbert v. Evans, 184 Mo. App. 283, -, 166 S.W. 635, 638 (1914) (quoting 4
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & PROCEDURE, Attorney and Client, at 965 (1902)) ("attorney must
be acquainted with the statutes and the settled rules of law and practice in the courts
prevailing in the locality wherein he practices, and is responsible for loss to his client
resulting from ignorance thereof"); In re Woods, 158 Tenn. 383, -, 13 S.W.2d 800, 803
(1929) (quoting 2 R.C.L. Attorneys at Law § 97 (1914)) ("attorney is liable...for the
consequences of his ignorance or nonobservance of the rules of court in which he practices,
or for his ignorance of the statutes and published decisions of his own state").
88. See cases cited supra note 87.
89. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text for cases discussing how the locality
rule affects the use of expert testimony.
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and the efforts courts have made to alleviate such problems.
While fashioning new standards, courts often strive to keep the
basic protection provided by the locality rule by imposing higher
standards on lawyers with greater resources and holding lawyers
with fewer resources to lesser standards. 90
Unlike the medical profession, the legal profession does not
have a national standard of care or certification program. 91 Each
state has general jurisdiction over most legal malpractice cases
under its police power and the state courts apply the law of each
particular state.92 The idea of a national standard of care has been
suggested,93 and many states do apply a general standard which
does not take into account any geographical boundaries.94 The
closest the legal profession comes to a national system of regula-
tion is the adoption by each state of either the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility or the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
95
In their treatise on legal malpractice, Ronald Mallen and
Victor Levit have formulated a composite standard of care for law-
yers from the common law which provides: "To determine the
reasonableness of the lawyer's conduct, it is necessary to consider
90. PEER REVIEW SYSTEM, supra note 21, at 11 (standards of competence vary,
reflecting differences in experience, values, and available resources).
91. See Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, -, 510 A.2d 436, 439 (1986) (legal profession has
not established a national certification for lawyers); LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at
21:4001 (ABA has taken the position that regulation of specialists is the province of the
states).
92. See LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at 301:102 ("[tlhere are slight variations
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the formulation of the standard used to determine
whether there is breach of duty"). All states require that an attorney must obtain a license
from state regulatory authorities to practice law. Id. at 21:101. Attorneys are therefore
considered officers of state courts. See Note, supra note 62, at 777.
93. Russo, 147 Vt. at -, 510 A.2d at 439.
94. The following jurisdictions use a general standard of care for legal malpractice:
California (see Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 1143, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 99 (1985)
(such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly
possess.)); Colorado (see Myers v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985)
(knowledge, skill, and judgment ordinarily possessed by members of the legal profession));
Iowa (see Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Iowa 1982) (such skill, prudence and
diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill commonly possess)); Massachusetts (see Fishman v.
Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, _, 487 N.E.2d 1377,1379 (1986) (degree of care and skill of average,
qualified, practitioner.)); New Jersey (see St. Pius X House of Retreats v. Diocese of Camden,
88 N.J. 571, -, 443 A.2d 1052, 1060-61 (1982) (knowledge and skill that lawyers of ordinary
ability possess.)); New Mexico (see First Nat'l Bank of Clovis v. Diane, Inc., 102 N.M. 548, -,
698 P.2d 5, 9 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (skill, knowledge, and prudence that lawyers of ordinary
skill and capacity commonly possess.)); New York (see Beer v. Florsheim, 96 A.D.2d 485, -,
465 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (skill commonly possessed by members of his
profession)); Pennsylvania (see Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3rd Cir. 1985) (skill
generally possessed by practitioners of the profession.); Ee Bon Ee Baya Ghananee v. Black,
350 Pa. Super. 134, -, 504 A.2d 281, 284 (1986) (ordinary skill and knowledge)); Utah (see
Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982) (legal knowledge and skills common to
members of his profession)).
95. See MODEL CODE and MODEL RULES, supra note 20.
AUA
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the following criteria: the requisite skill and knowledge; the
degree of skill and knowledge to be possessed and exercised; the
effect of local considerations and custom; and any special abilities
possessed by the lawyer." 96 Even though the inclusion of a locality
element in the standard of care is a minority position,97 these
authors have deemed local considerations to be of sufficient impor-
tance to include it in their composite standard. 98 Even so, Mallen
and Levit have translated locality, custom, and special skills into an
even simpler standard, labeling these elements "similar circum-
stances." 99  Requiring lawyers to exercise the degree of skill,
knowledge, and care that ordinary lawyers would exercise under
similar circumstances gives the court the flexibility to consider all
relevant factors when defining the standard of care, rather than
only those enumerated in formulas set forth by appellate courts.100
A minority of jurisdictions do, however, take into considera-
tion the specific locality or community where the defendant law-
yer practices when defining the standard of care.101 In addition,
there are also several jurisdictions which apply variations of the
geographical limitations to the standard of care for lawyers that
are broader than the specific locality of practice.1 0 2 Geographic
limitations of the standard of care for lawyers can be grouped into
four categories. Courts will usually state a general rule such as that
stated by the Kansas Supreme Court in Bowman v. Doherty,10 3
that "[a]n attorney is obligated to his client to... use his best judg-
96. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 251, at 317-18.
97. For cases utilizing a locality element, see infra note 101.
98. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 251, at 318.
99. Id.
100. Id., § 254, at 337. For a discussion of the similar circumstances element of the
standard of care for lawyers, see supra notes 172-96 and accompanying text.
101. See, Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Ala. 1983) (lawyer required to
exercise ordinary and reasonable level of skill, knowledge, care, attention, and prudence
common to members of legal profession in the community); Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, -,
378 S.W.2d 655, 661 (1964) (requisite standard of care is what an ordinarily careful and
prudent practitioner in the county would have done); Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870,
-, 686 P.2d 112, 120 (1984) (attorney must use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence,
his or her best judgment, and exercise reasonable degree of learning, skill, and experience
ordinarily possessed by attorneys in the community); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 263 La. 774, -, 269 So. 2d 239, 244 (1972) (attorney obligated to exercise degree of
care, skill, and diligence exercised by prudent attorneys in his locality); Dean v. Conn, 419
So. 2d 148, 150 (Miss. 1982) (attorneys and physicians are required to use degree of skill and
diligence commonly possessed and exercised in that locality); Arp v. Kerrigan, 287 Or. 73,
-, 597 P.2d 813, 821 (1979) (attorney required to use care, skill, and diligence ordinarily
used by lawyers in the community in similar circumstances); Patterson & Wallace v. Frazer,
79 S.W. 1077, 1080 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) (attorney required to use skill and diligence as
recognized by the profession where he practices law).
102. For a discussion of geographical limitations other than the locality rule, see infra
notes 106-07 and accompanying text; see also R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254,
at 335-36 (variation among courts in defining "locality").
103. 235 Kan. 870, 686 P.2d 112 (1984).
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ment, and to exercise that reasonable degree of learning, skill and
experience which is ordinarily possessed by other attorneys." ''4
One or more of the following elements is then added to limit the
general rule:
1) in the locality or community, 05
2) in similar localities,' 0
6
3) in the state or jurisdiction,1 0 7 or
4) under similar circumstances.1
0 8
The addition of such elements particularizes the standard of care
and forces the court and the parties to take note of the different
104. Id. at __, 686 P.2d at 120.
105. For a discussion of jurisdictions utilizing the "in the locality or community"
variation, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
106. See Bent v. Green, 39 Conn. Supp. 416, -., 466 A.2d 322, 325 (1983) (level of duty
was to exercise the same degree of care, skill, and diligence which other attorneys in the
same or similar locality and in the same line of practice possess acting under similar
circumstances); Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, -, 329 S.E.2d 355, 366 (1985) (standard is
that of members of the profession acting in the same or similar locality under similar
circumstances); Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., 311 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D. 1981)
(attorney is held to the degree of skill, care, diligence and knowledge ordinarily possessed
by members of the legal profession in good standing in similar communities); Lenius v.
King, 294 N.W.2d 912, 913-14 (S.D. 1980) (attorney has a duty to have the degree of
learning and skill ordinarily possessed by attorneys in good standing engaged in the same
type of practice, in the same or similar locality, under similar circumstances); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g. (1965) ("standard is rather that of
persons engaged in similar practices in similar localities, considering geographical location,
size, and generally, the character of the community").
107. See Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 254 Ga. 4, -, 325 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1985) (applicable
standard in Georgia is that of the state); Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926, 928 (Miss.
1982) (attorney must execute the case with the degree of care, skill, and diligence
commonly possessed and exercised by attorneys in the jurisdiction); Martinson Bros. v.
Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 872 (N.D. 1985) (lawyers must exercise that degree of care
commonly possessed and exercised by other reasonable, careful and prudent lawyers in the
state); Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 225 (N.D. 1971) (same); Cleckner v. Dale, 719
S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (same); Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20 510 A.2d 436,
438 (1986) (same); Halvorsen v. Ferguson, 46 Wash. App. 708, 712, 735 P.2d 675, 678 (1986)
(attorneys must exercise the degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly
possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law
in the jurisdiction); Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausin, 73 Wash. 2d 393, -, 438 P.2d 865,
866-67 (1968) (same).
108. See Sarti v. Udall, 91 Ariz. 24,-.., 369 P.2d 92, 93 (1962) (standard of care must be
decided in light of all the facts and circumstances); Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802,
809, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1975) (standard is that of lawyers in the same or similar locality
under similar circumstances); Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, -, 50 Cal. Rptr.
592, 595 (1966) (same); O'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C. 1982) (lawyer must
exercise degree of care and skill expected of lawyers acting under similar circumstances);
Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977) (lawyer must use knowledge, skill,
and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession in similar
circumstances); Meagher v. Kavli,. 256 Minn. 54, 57, 97 N.W.2d 370, 373 (1959) (lawyers
conduct is to be appraised in light of all circumstances); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 477
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (lawyer impliedly represents he or she possesses the degree of
learning, skill, and ability which others similarly situated possess); Helmbrecht v. St. Paul
Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, -, 362 N.W.2d 118, 128 (1985) (standard for legal malpractice is
what a reasonable or prudent attorney would have done in the same circumstance); see also,
Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 485 (1934) (expert opinion allowed to determine if the
defendant's action was the same as other reputable lawyers would have pursued under like
circumstances).
conditions under which attorneys must work, on the assumption
that they are essential to an objective evaluation of the defendant's
conduct.10 9 The fourth category listed above, similar circum-
stances, is included as a geographical limitation because when the
locality of practice is relevant, it can be considered a circumstance
included in the standard of care. 110
Although the aforementioned variations to the standard of
care all involve geographical limitations, there are other methods
available for particularizing a standard of care for attorneys. This
section also discusses the application of a higher standard of care
for legal specialists.' A higher standard for specialists functions
similarly to the four geographical limitations in that it varies the
standard of care in relation to the resources available to different
classes of lawyers. The following analysis will consider why courts
may choose to add one or more of the elements listed above to the
general rule, or choose to adopt a general standard of care which
does not include a locality element.
1. The Basic Locality Rule: "In the Locality"
or "In the Community"
This section discusses the locality rule, which in its narrowest
form holds a lawyer to the standard of an ordinary attorney prac-
ticing in the same locality as the defendant."' Typically, when
the basic locality rule is at issue, the defendant is attempting to use
it to lower the standard of care." 3 There are, however, two situa-
tions in which a locality rule may serve to raise the standard of
care: 1) the existence of numerous specialists in a given area; and
2) the existence of special local rules and customs.
Most lawyers who specialize are located in metropolitan
areas." 4 Consequently, the normal level of skill in a metropolitan
109. See Note, supra note 62, at 775 ("objectivity is achieved through the.. .technique
of determining customary professional conduct in similar circumstances, and holding the
defendant liable only for a deviation from that custom").
110. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 251, at 318.
111. For the discussion of a higher standard of care for legal specialists, see infra notes
197-238.
112. For a discussion of jurisdictions utilizing a locality limitation in the standard of
care for legal malpractice, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
113. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 333. The original rationale for the
locality rule was to protect the rural attorney from the higher standard of care established
by urban attorneys. Id.
114. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 86, § 2:11, at 35 (although communication and
education are improved, legal specialization is more common in metropolitan areas than in
less populated regions); cf. Gillen, Legal Malpractice, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 281, 290 (1973)
(community standard takes into account differences in local practice and also the
differences in resources and opportunities available to urban specialists and rural
generalities).
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locality with a high population of specialists may be close to that of
a specialist. The locality rule functions to vary the standard of care
according to the customary level of skill in a particular locality. 1 '
Therefore, hypothetically, the locality rule could be used to raise
the degree of skill in a large city to an unreasonably high level, in
effect creating an unworkable environment for the general practi-
tioner. Under such an enhanced standard of care, an ordinary
general practitioner may have a duty to refer many of his or her
potential clients to a specialist, thereby reducing income opportu-
nities. 1 6 Therefore, like the proverbial two-edged sword, applica-
tion of a locality rule could serve to injure as well as protect
lawyers in certain situations such as this.
A second situation in which the locality rule may increase the
requisite standard of care is the existence of local rules and cus-
toms, of which a lawyer practicing in that community must be
aware of and apply in his or her practice." 7 In this situation, a
lawyer will be held to a higher standard of knowledge of the local
rules than an attorney from another locality, and therefore, the
local attorney is in fact a specialist of sorts."" In addition, special
characteristics about a community such as local customs or pecu-
liarities may affect the appropriate strategy necessary to be an
effective advocate." 9 In such a situation, an attorney in that local-
ity would have the additional responsibility of evaluating and
accounting for such special characteristics. 120 Therefore, in addi-
tion to the rationale for a locality rule parallel to that in medical
malpractice cases of protecting rural practitioners from unreasona-
bly high standards, there exists this additional rationale for includ-
115. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 333.
116. For a discussion of a lawyer's duty to refer, see infra notes 329-36 and
accompanying text.
117. In re Gabbert v. Evans, 184 Mo. App. 283 166 S.W. 635, 638 (1914) (quoting 4
Cyc. Attorney and Client, at 965 (1902)) ("attorney must be acquainted with the statute and
the settled rules of law and practice in the courts prevailing in the locality wherein he
practices, and is responsible for loss to his client resulting from ignorance thereof"); In re
Woods, 158 Tenn. 383, -, 13 S.W.2d 800, 803 (1929) ("attorney is liable...for the
consequences of his ignorance or nonobservance of the rules of court in which he practices,
or for his ignorance of the statutes and published decisions of his own state"); R. MALLEN &
V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334.
118. B. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 253, at 328 (attorneys are specialists in
regard to the rules, practices, or laws peculiar to the locality where they practice).
119. See, e.g., Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 477-78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (makeup of
the jury panel and knowledge of the local situation are important considerations for a
lawyer to recognize when planning the strategies for a case); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra
note 5, § 254, at 334 (racial, economic, or social characteristics of a community may be
important for planning the strategy of a case).
120. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334 (attorney may be negligent for
having lack of knowledge of characteristics of local community and judicial rules).
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ing a locality rule in the standard of care for lawyers. 12 1
The basic "in the locality" option has been criticized as
unworkable. 122 There are two basic complaints. The first com-
plaint is that such a standard, in effect, eliminates the use of expert
testimony by the plaintiff to establish an appropriate standard
because attorneys in the same community are often reluctant to
testify against each other. 12 3  This same "conspiracy of silence"
exists in medical malpractice cases.1 2 4 The second complaint, as
stated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is that "[i]f there are
only three physicians in a small town, and all three are highly
incompetent, they cannot be permitted to set a standard of utter
inferiority for a fourth who comes to town. 1 125 To combat these
inherent problems, the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted the
"similar communities" standard, which allows expert testimony by
attorneys from communities of similar size and character.1 26 This
variation of the locality rule is discussed in the next section.
2. "Similar Locality or Community" Variation
Some courts have expanded the scope of the standard of care
for lawyers beyond the specific locality or community where the
defendant practices. 127 The "similar localities" standard is an ele-
ment added to the standard of care which requires that a lawyer
attain the level of skill and exercise the degree of care as would an
121. Id.
122. See Note, supra note 14, at 404 (adherence to a locality-based standard hinders the
prosecution of legal malpractice claims). New Hampshire enacted a statute that specifically
removes any reference to a professional's locality or any other geographical area. N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 508:13 (1983). The statute provides that "the jury or judge shall not be bound
or limited by the standard of care accepted or established with respect to any particular
geographical area or locality .. ." Id.
123. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 333. The authors explain the
expert shortage and "conspiracy of silence" caused by the inclusion of a locality rule in the
standard of care:
If expert testimony is required, locality considerations may limit the
geographical area from which such testimony must be produced and thereby
impair the ability of the plaintiff to establish his case .... The plaintiff may find
extreme reluctance among local practitioners to testify against a fellow attorney.
Id.
124. See Hansbrough v. Kosyak, 141 Ill. App. 3d 538, __, 490 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1986)
(obtaining expert testimony from physician in the same community was difficult thereby
creating a "conspiracy of silence" which deprived plaintiffs of the expert medical testimony
essential to establishing a medical malpractice case).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g (1965).
126. Id. Comment g of § 299A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that the
"similar communities" standard does not apply to lawyers because there is little variation in
skill and knowledge between communities. Id. For an additional discussion of the "similar
communities" standard, see infra notes 127-60 and accompanying text.
127. Note, supra note 14, at 404 n.59. For a discussion of jurisdictions utilizing the
"similar locality or community" standard, see supra note 101.
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ordinary lawyer practicing in a similar community.1 28 Expansion
of the basic locality standard allows either party to bring in expert
witnesses from outside the community where the alleged miscon-
duct occurred.12 9 This serves to alleviate the expert shortage and
"conspiracy of silence" that plagued the application of the basic
locality rule.
130
Although the "similar localities" standard serves to alleviate
problems associated with the narrow locality rule, it can also be a
source of other problems.13' For instance, since the "similar locali-
ties" standard allows the parties to bring in expert witnesses from
outside the locality of practice, courts must determine whether
the expert's locality of practice is "similar" to that of the defend-
ant.132 When making this determination, the court should con-
sider the geographic location, size, and character of the expert's
locality.' 33 Properly chosen, an expert from a locality demograph-
ically similar to the defendant attorney's locality will share similar
resources, experience, and opportunities. 134  Nonetheless, an
expert from a similar but different locality may be completely
ignorant of the rules, customs, and characteristics peculiar to the
practice of law in the defendant's locality.'
35
The often cited case of Cook v. Irion 136 is illustrative of the
problems associated with the "similar localities or communities"
rule. In Cook, the plaintiffs retained the defendant attorney to
prosecute a personal injury action in El Paso County, Texas, which
had a population of 314,070 at the time of the action. 37 During a
shopping center's grand opening promotion, plaintiff Cook
tripped on a television cable in a shopping center and fell, sus-
taining an injury.'13  The three potential defendants were the
128. For a discussion of jurisdictions utilizing a "similar localities" variation, see supra
note 106.
129. See, e.g., Hansbrough v. Kosyak, 141 II. App. 3d 538, __, 490 N.E.2d 181, 185
(1986) (similar community standard serves to defeat the "conspiracy of silence").
130. For a discussion of the "conspiracy of silence" associated with expert testimony
and legal malpractice, see supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. See also
Hansbrough, 141 Il1. App. 3d at -, 490 N.E.2d at 185 (similar community standard serves to
defeat the "conspiracy of silence").
131. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334-35.
132. Note, supra note 14, at 404 n.59.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g (1965).
134. Cf. Note, supra note 62, at 782 (lawyers' resources, opportunities, and experience
vary among communities).
135. Id. One legal writer has noted that "'what constitutes proper legal practice in one
community may not be proper in another, even though the external resources and other
features of the communities are identical." Id.
136. 409 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
137. See Cooke v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 476, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
138. Id. at 476.
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shopping center, the television company, and the merchants' asso-
ciation who sponsored the promotion. 39 Upon the advice of the
defendant attorney, only the merchants' association was named as
a defendant in the plaintiffs' personal injury claim.' 4 ° An
instructed verdict was granted to the merchants' association, a
take-nothing judgment was entered, and no appeal was made.' 4 '
The plaintiffs then proceeded to sue the defendant attorney for
malpractice, contending that the defendant attorney was negli-
gent in suing only the merchants' association.'
42
The plaintiffs retained as an expert witness, an attorney who
practiced in Brewster County, Texas, which was 220 miles away
and had a population of 6,434.14 1 In addition, the plaintiffs' expert
witness had never tried a case in El Paso County. 14 4 The trial
court permitted the plaintiffs' expert witness to testify that the
defendant "had failed to exercise the standard of care of the aver-
age general practitioner in the State of Texas in not suing all three
of the possible defendants."' 45 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
disagreed, holding that the plaintiffs' expert witness was not quali-
fied to testify as to the standard of care in El Paso County. 
146
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Cook approved the stan-
dard of care set forth in the often cited 1954 North Carolina case
of Hodges v. Carter.1 47 The Hodges version of the standard of care
for lawyers demands that an attorney possess the skill "which
others similarly situated ordinarily possess.... "148 Apparently, the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals court interpreted the Hodges lan-
guage as applied to this case to call for the degree of care, skill, and
139. Id.
140. Id. The plaintiff originally brought suit against the shopping center. Id. This




143. Id. at 477-78.
144. Id. at 477.
145. Id. The defendant attorney in Cook objected to the admission of the plaintiff's
expert testimony, but the objection was overruled and the testimony was allowed. Id.
146. ld. at 478. Referring to the defendant attorney's decision to sue only the
merchants' association, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Cook noted that even though
the shopping center was not made a defendant, the corporation which owned the shopping
center was a member of the merchants' association. Id. at 477-78. The court therefore
affirmed the trial court's result which was a directed verdict for the defendant, holding that
since the plaintiff's expert witness was not qualified to testify as to the standard of care in El
Paso County, the evidence the plaintiff presented was insufficient to establish that the
defendant was negligent in handling the plaintiff's lawsuit. Id. at 478.
147. Id. at 477 (quoting Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-46
(1954)). For the language relied on by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, see supra note 4
and accompanying text.
148. Hodges, 239 N.C. at 520, 80 S.E.2d at 146.
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diligence customarily exercised by attorneys practicing in El Paso
County. 1
49
In holding that the plaintiffs' witness was not qualified to tes-
tify as to the standard of care in El Paso County, the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals stated that, "[i]n this situation it was a matter of
judgment to be exercised in the light of the local situation and the
attorney's experience, as to whether any advantage could be
gained by joining additional defendants. ' 150 The court further
explained its conclusion that the expert witness was not qualified
to testify by stating:
[A]n attorney practicing in a vastly different locality
would not be qualified to second-guess the judgment of an
experienced attorney of the El Paso County Bar as to who
should be joined as additional party defendants .... [T]he
probable make-up of the jury panel is an important con-
sideration of whom to sue where there is an option. The
importance of knowledge of the local situation is fully
demonstrated by the well-recognized practice among the
lawyers of this State in associating local counsel in the trial
of most important jury cases.
15'
The court concluded that since the plaintiffs' expert witness was
not qualified to testify as to the standard of care in El Paso County,
the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendant attorney was
negligent in the handling of the plaintiffs' lawsuit.1
52
Although the court in Cook did not explicitly include a "simi-
lar communities" element in its version of the standard of care for
lawyers, 153 Cook provides a good analysis of the inherent problems
in the "similar localities or communities" standard in determining
whether the expert witness is qualified to testify as to the standard
of care for the particular defendant lawyer.154 The court in Cook
recognized that the locality where the defendant practiced and
the locality where the expert witness practiced were "vastly differ-
ent" due to the difference in population and distance apart.
155
149. See Cook, 409 S.W.2d at 478.
150. Id. at 478.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 477. The court used the standard of care articulated in Hodges v. Carter.
Id.; see Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1954). The Hodges
standard requires attorneys to use the degree of skill which others similarly situated possess.
Hodges, 239 N.C. at 520, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46.
154. See Cook, 409 S.W.2d at 477. See also R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254,
at 334-35 (citing Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)).
155. Cook, 409 S.W.2d at 478.
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Therefore, the court implicitly recognized that an expert witness
from a community very similar to the defendant's may have been
qualified to present evidence of the standard of care applicable to
the defendant. Even so, the court emphasized the importance of
factors such as "the probable make-up of the jury" and "knowl-
edge of the local situation. ' 156 This emphasis on the particular
characteristics of the locality in which the defendant practiced
indicates that the court may have preferred the basic locality rule
to the "similar localities or communities" standard.
The Cook v. Irion rationale for including a locality element in
the standard of care for lawyers is dissimilar to the rationale which
explains its use in medical malpractice cases. 157 Unlike medical
practice, legal practice is often affected by local customs, practices,
and characteristics.1 5 8 Such parochial factors which influence an
attorney's actions are often intangible, except to a practitioner
experienced in dealing with them, and thus, an attorney must be
given a certain degree of flexibility in judgment which cannot be
specifically written into a rule.' 9 Therefore, even though an
expert witness may be from a community that is demographically
similar to the community in question, he or she may not be quali-




157. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334. Citing Cook as an
example, the authors stated that -[u]nlike the medical field, . knowledge of local. practices,
rules, or customs may be determinative of, and essential to, the exercise of adequate care
and skill." Id.
158. Id. (attorneys in general must be knowledgeable of local statutes or ordinances,
and trial attorneys, in particular, place great weight on the racial, economic, or social
characteristics of the community).
159. See J. ELWELL, supra note 41, at 25-26 (physicians and attorneys must deal with
contingencies which no person can feel sure of anticipating or controlling).
160. See Note, supra note 62, at 782; cf. Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co., 317 F.2d 56,
60 (5th Cir. 1963). In Gleason, the defendant attorney erroneously certified clear title to
property his client was contemplating purchasing. Id. at 58. In performing a title search,
the attorney had relied on information from abstract companies. Id. at 59. Unfortunately,
the tract book the abstract companies were using was six weeks behind. Id. In his defense,
the defendant attorney claimed that reliance on such records was the custom of attorneys in
his locality. Id. at 60. From a judgment issued against him, the defendant attorney
appealed. Id. at 56. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Counsel stresses particularly that [appellant-attorney's] duty to the plaintiff
must be measured by the community standards of professional conduct
prevailing in Brevard County at the time [he] did his work. ...
This Court and trial court had no quarrel with the law the appellant cites.
As the trial judge said, "Except for the situation that developed in Brevard
County during the land boom, * * * [this case] does not present any question at
all."...
.[I]n the record before us there is no evidence whatsoever that the
community condoned the absence of a proper caveat to the certification which
would indicate the time lag between the date of the attorney's last reliable
information and the date of the certificate.
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3. "In the State or Jurisdiction" Variation
A few courts have defined the locality of practice broadly to
include the state or jurisdiction. 161 Under this standard, all law-
yers within the state or jurisdiction are held to the same level of
excellence. 16' The rationale for this variation of the locality rule is
that all lawyers within a state must pass the same entrance exami-
nation. 163 The effect of the rule is to limit expert testimony to law-
yers who practice within the jurisdiction.164  Therefore, this
standard serves to prevent the importation of experts from foreign
jurisdictions and thus protects the defendant practitioner from
being held to an unfamiliar standard of care. 165
There are, however, several problems with characterizing the
state as the locality of practice. In a sparsely populated state like
North Dakota, practitioners may be reluctant to testify against
each other, continuing the same "conspiracy of silence" that weak-
ened the basic locality rule. 166 Second, although the courts that
have adopted this rule state that the standards of practice do not
differ between the communities within the state, 67 many states
have both rural and metropolitan areas where the location of prac-
tice may have an effect on the quality and character of advo-
cacy.' 6" Finally, there is the possibility that limiting the standard
of care to the state may foster an unacceptably low level of per-
formance in certain areas of the law. 169 It is plausible that in some
areas of law, all the lawyers in a given state may lack the necessary
skill, knowledge, and experience to handle a case properly.
170 If
Id. at 60. The result in Gleason illustrates how important local rules, customs, and practices
are when judging the conduct of an attorney. Therefore, if testimony by an expert witness
from a foreign locality is used to establish the standard of care, the result may be unjust.
161. For a discussion of jurisdictions using the state as the locality of practice, see supra
note 107.
162. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 336-37. The authors consider the
state or jurisdiction the most logical geographical limitation for the standard of care for
lawyers. Id. at 336. They emphasize that the "degree of care should be the same
throughout the jurisdiction which qualifies and licenses attorneys... ." Id. at 337.
163. Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, -, 438 P.2d 865, 866-67
(1968). The Supreme Court of Washington reasoned that all attorneys within its jurisdiction
are licensed by the state and are thus subject to minimum and standardized qualifications.
Id.
164. Note, supra note 14, at 406-07.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 405-06.
167. See Cook, 73 Wash. 2d at -, 438 P.2d at 866; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 299A comment g (1965).
168. Gillen, supra note 114, at 290 (characterization of the locality of practice as the
entire state is too broad, ignoring such important factors as specialization, access to
resources, and experience).




such were the case, testimony by a lawyer practicing in that state
as to the standard of care in a similar situation would serve to per-
171petuate an unacceptably low level of legal service.
4. "Under Similar Circumstances" Variation
The "under similar circumstances" standard is included as a
geographical limitation on a lawyer's standard of care because the
location where an attorney practices may be a relevant circum-
stance in determining the appropriate standard of care. 17 2 A Dis-
trict of Columbia court provided a typical formulation of this
element, stating: "[A] lawyer must exercise that degree of reason-
able care and skill expected of lawyers acting under similar cir-
cumstances.' 73 When applying a standard of care which includes
a "similar circumstances" element, a court may consider circum-
stances such as locality, custom, special skills, and other relevant
factors within the facts of the case which may have influenced the
attorney's conduct.' 74 Some courts include a "similar locality or
community" element with the "similar circumstances" ele-
ment. 71 In addition, a few courts have combined the "similar cir-
cumstances" element with both a "similar locality or community"
element and a specialization element. 76  The inclusion of such
combinations of limiting factors in the standard of care for lawyers
is an attempt by the courts to fashion a standard that is as objective
and specific to the facts of the case as possible.
177
Although the "similar circumstances" rule is much broader
than the basic locality rule and may include non-geographical fac-
171. Id. at 407.
172. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 251, at 318, § 254, at 334 (locality, custom,
and special skills are similar circumstances).
173. O'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C. 1982) (quoting Morrison v. MacNamara,
407 A.2d 555, 561 (1979)).
174. See Note, supra note 14, at 415. The Note formulated a hypothetical standard of
care which included the relevant circumstances from the facts of Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt.
20. 510 A.2d 436 (1986):
Attorney Griffin should have exercised the knowledge and skill ordinarily
possessed by attorneys advising a family held business on how to structure a
corporate buy out when one of the parties wishes to sell his or her interest in the
corporation in order to start a new, but different, business venture in the same
community.
Note, supra note 14, at 415; see Russo, 147 Vt. at -, 510 A.2d at 439.
175. See, e.g., Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, _, 329 S.E.2d 355, 366 (1985) (standard is
that of members of profession in same or similar locality under similar circumstances).
176. See, e.g., Bent v. Green, 39 Conn. Supp. 416, -, 466 A.2d 322, 325 (1983) (level of
duty was to exercise the same degree of care, skill, and diligence which other attorneys in
the same or similar locality, and in the same line of practice, would have exercised under
similar circumstances).
177. See Note, supra note 62, at 775-76 (standard of care must be particularized to
specific facts of each case).
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tors, this element in the standard of care originated to alleviate the
same problems that spawned the locality rule:' 7 ' 1) the need for
services under circumstances over which a lawyer has no control;
and 2) circumstances which a lawyer must be familiar with in
order to practice effectively. 179 In addition, the "similar circum-
stances" standard serves to protect both the practitioner and the
public by making the standard of care for lawyers more specific,
objective, and fair.'8 °
There are real differences between a rural and an urban prac-
tice which result from circumstances which the profession has lit-
tle power to change.' 8 ' A rural attorney may not have the
research and financial resources available to him or her that an
attorney in a large metropolitan firm enjoys. 182 Rural lawyers are
often sole practitioners or are members of small firms in communi-
ties where there are few other lawyers, and therefore, they have
little opportunity to specialize.18 3 The "similar circumstances"
element therefore recognizes that circumstances such as available
resources and specialization may be relevant to determining the
requisite standard of care.1
8 4
The "similar circumstances" element, like the locality rule,
also serves to protect rural lawyers from an unreasonably high
standard of care by taking into consideration the quasi-emergency
circumstances under which a rural lawyer may have to practice.'
8 5
178. Note, supra note 14, at 414-15, 417 (addition of similar circumstances element to
standard of care provides the same protection as the locality rule without the adverse side
affects).
179. Id. at 417. The commentator explains how the addition of the "similar
circumstances" element makes the law more fair to both practitioners and clients by
allowing courts to tailor the standard of care to fit each case. Id. The commentator stated:
Because it focuses on reasonable conduct under the circumstances, the
["similar circumstances"] standard of care does not prejudice general
practitioners by subjecting them to a standard which compares their conduct to
that of a legal specialists....
..If the attorney's conduct giving rise to the malpractice suite involves the
application of a local or state substantive or procedural rule, then that
"circumstance" would necessarily limit the available experts to those attorneys
who are familiar with the rule.
Id.
180. Id. at 418 ("[similar circumstances] standard facilitates the adoption of a standard
which is national in scope yet fair to the local bar, because it limits expert testimony to
attorneys familiar with legitimate local differences").
181. HOUSTON CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at xiii ("urban bar and the communities of
rural practitioners differ profoundly").
182. Gillen, supra note 114, at 290.
183. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 86, § 2:11, at 35.
184. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 337. The authors states that, in a
sense, "locality is no different than custom or specialization, which are appropriately
treated as. . .'similar circumstances'." Id.
185. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 251, at 318; MODEL RULES, supra note
20, Rule 1.1 comment (1984). The comment to Model Rule 1.1 states that in an emergency,
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Rural lawyers may not have the necessary experience to handle
certain types of cases and may have little time, money, or opportu-
nity to learn new methods." 6 If a rural lawyer declines such a
case, the client may be without legal services. If a referral to a
more qualified lawyer is possible, the rural lawyer loses a potential
source of income.'8 7  Consequently, if a lawyer practicing in a
rural community cannot earn an adequate living, he or she may
leave the community.' The decision courts must ultimately
make is whether less than adequate legal services are better than
none at all.
Lawyers must also be familiar with certain circumstances such
as the rules, customs, and characteristics specific to the area in
which they practice in order to provide competent services.' 9
The original locality element of the lawyer's standard of care not
only protected rural attorneys, but also created a special duty for
all lawyers:' 90 All attorneys are required to be familiar with the
factors peculiar to the localities where they practice.19 The "simi-
lar circumstances" element serves this same purpose because the
rules, customs, and characteristics of a particular locality may dif-
a lawyer may provide services concerning a matter in which the lawyer is not completely
competent to act upon if referral, association, or consultation with a more qualified lawyer
would be impractical. Id.
186. See Chaplin, The Structure of Legal Specialization in the 1980s, HOUSTON
CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 349, 383-84 (1981) ("prior experience in performing a
given lawyering task in a complex area of the law may often be essential to competent
performance"); see also id. at 379 (factors to be considered in undertaking employment in
an area where one is not already qualified include preparation, time, and cost).
187. ABA, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE
GENERAL PRACTITIONER AND THE ORGANIZED BAR 34 (1984) [hereinafter TASK FORCE ON
THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER]. The report stated: "There is a belief that many general
practitioners are reluctant to limit their practice to areas in which they are proficient
because, simply put, they need the money." Id.
188. Cf. J. ELWELL, supra note 41, at 22. The author of this 1881 medical malpractice
treatise stated that in isolated communities in rural states, medical aid was difficult to obtain
and thus, "the inexperienced and the unlearned attend to the surgery...or it is not
attended to at all." Id. The Model Code discouraged referrals by inhibiting fee splitting.
TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 34; MODEL CODE, supra
note 20, DR 2-107(A). The Model Code only allowed the division of fees in proportion to
the services performed and responsibility assumed by each attorney. Id. This problem has
been alleviated somewhat in states that have adopted the Model Rules, where fees may be
divided, with the consent of the client, in any way the associating attorneys like, as long as
each attorney assumes joint responsibility for the services. TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL
PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 35; MODEL RULES, supra note 20, Rule 1.5(e).
189. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334. For a discussion of
jurisdictions specifically recognizing the need for an attorney to be familiar with local rules
and procedures, see supra note 117 and accompanying text; see also Gillen, supra note 114,
at 290 ("[w]hat constitutes customary legal practice varies not merely with resources and
opportunities available to the attorney but also from one community to another").
190. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334.
191. E.g., Gabbert v. Evans, 184 Mo. App. 283, -, 166 S.W. 635, 638 (1914) (attorney
must be acquainted with statutes and settled rules of law and practice in the locality in
which he or she practices, and is responsible for loss to his or her client resulting from
ignorance thereof).
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fer from those in another, and therefore may be circumstances rel-
evant to defining the standard of care for a particular case. 92
The "similar circumstances" formulation is not a new con-
cept,19 3 but it has been recently promoted by commentators as a
model for adoption by the courts.1 9 4 Perhaps a more specific rule,
which might include a geographical limitation such as "in the
state" or "in similar communities," is necessary to remind courts
that where an attorney practices may affect his ability to per-
form.'95 Adding the words "under similar circumstances" to the
general standard of care for lawyers may not really change the
way a court views an attorney's performance, but it is merely a call
for sound legal reasoning - the process of applying the appropri-
ate rules to all of the relevant facts.'
96
5. Special Standards for Specialists
Some states hold specialists to a higher standard of care,
requiring those lawyers who accept work in a specialized area of
the law or hold themselves out as specialists, to exercise the degree
of skill and knowledge possessed by other specialists in that partic-
ular area of law.' 97 There is nothing geographical about a higher
192. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 251, at 318.
193. See Meagher v. Kavli, 256 Minn. 54, 57, 97 N.W.2d 370, 373 (1959) (lawyer's
professional conduct in representing his client is appraised in light of all circumstances);
Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 485 (1934) (expert opinion is allowed to determine if a
defendant's action was the same as other reputable lawyers would have pursued under like
circumstances).
194. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 251, at 318, § 254, at 337; Note, supra
note 14, at 414-18.
195. See Note, supra note 62, at 782 ("[b]y omitting the locality of practice element,
courts may overlook differences in resources and opportunities for experience among
attorneys in widely varying communities.").
196. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (a fair assessment of an
attorney's conduct must be done from the defendant attorneys' perspective in light of the
circumstances to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight). For the standard of care to
be fair and effective, it must be carefully applied to the specific factual situation of the case.
Note, supra note 62, at 775-76. Therefore, it is important that the standard of care include
language which demands that the fact-finder consider all of the relevant circumstances
which affected the defendant attorney's conduct. Id.
197. See Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1975)
(specialist in maritime law must exercise the same degree of care exercised by other
specialists of ordinary skill and capacity specializing in the same field); Bent v. Green, 39
Conn. Supp. 416, -, 466 A.2d 322, 325 (1983) (taxation and financial planning specialist had
duty to exercise same degree of care which other attorneys in the same line of practice
would have exercised); O'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C. 1982) (those with special
training and experience must adhere to the standard of conduct commensurate with such
attributes); Bowman v. Doherty, 235 Kan. 870, -, 686 P.2d 112, 120 (1984) (negligence is
judged by the professional standards of the particular area of the law in which the
practitioner is involved); Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, __, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1379
(1986) (attorney who has not held himself out as a specialist owes his client the duty to
exercise the degree of care and skill of the average, qualified practitioner); Procanik v. Cillo,
206 N.J. Super. 270, -, 502 A.2d 94, 103 (1985) (specialist has a multi-tier standard of duty);
Rodriguez v. Horton, 95 N.M. 356, -, 622 P.2d 261, 264 (1980) (lawyer holding himself out
AAA
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standard of care for specialists. Nevertheless, applying higher
standards to specialists serves as a type of locality rule because it is
designed to serve a similar purpose - protecting rural attorneys
from an unreasonably higher standard of care. 98 In general, rural
lawyers are, by necessity, general practitioners, whereas urban
lawyers often have a greater opportunity to specialize.199 Both the
locality and specialist standards protect the practitioner who has
fewer resources and opportunities from being held to an unrealis-
tic level of skill, while still protecting consumers by holding the
practitioner with superior skills, experience, resources, and oppor-
tunities to the level of care he or she professes to possess.20
In medical malpractice cases, there is a trend toward aban-
doning the locality rule in favor of different standards for general-
ists and specialists. 20  The specialist/generalist dichotomy is a
more specific and accurate method to categorize different groups
within a profession.20 2 Nevertheless, such a standard does not take
into account circumstances that may be important in a legal mal-
as specialist must exercise the same skill as other specialists of ordinary ability in the same
field); Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wash. 2d 854, __, 601 P.2d 1279, 1283 (1979) (one who holds
himself out as a specialist will be held to the standard of performance of other specialists in
that same area); see also LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at 21:4001 (ABA has taken the
position that regulation of specialists is the province of the states).
198. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 253, at 328 ("[r]ecognition of speciality
considerations is similar to recognition of locality considerations"). Cf., Gillen, supra note
114, at 290. Gillen states:
A community standard has a pragmatic rationale. By omitting this factor, courts
may overlook differences in admission requirements, resources and
opportunities. The obvious specialization in metropolitan areas compared with
the more generalized practice in rural areas supports this criteria's validity.
Id. (emphasis added).
199. See TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 16-17.
Most people perceive urban lawyers as large firm specialists and rural lawyers as solo
general practitioners. Id. Even though most solo practitioners actually practice in cities,
solo and small firm practices are more likely than large firms to be located in a rural setting.
Id.
200. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 253, at 328.
201. Annotation, Modern Status of "Locality Rule" in Malpractice Action Against
Physician Who is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R.3d 1133, 1138, 1151 (1980). The annotator
substantially concluded that factors such as. improved education, transportation, and
communication have promoted a recent trend for courts to recognize a standard of care
that is uniform across the nation, with a typical rule being: "[A] physician is under a duty to
use that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner
in the same class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances." Id. at
1151. Cf Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[i]t seems clear that the
medical profession itself has adopted a national standard for membership in one of its
certified specialties"). The court in Robbins noted that "[i]f the law remains tied to a
locality standard, it ignores the reality of modern medicine in favor of an outdated
mythology." Id. at 129.
202. See Hirschberg v. State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, -, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470, 474-75 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1977) (court abandoned the locality rule because it was an obsolete and imprecise method
to define the standard of care). The court in Hirschberg recognized that "[tihe more
progressive principle adopted in sister states places the emphasis upon professional
proficiency rather than geographical proximity." Id. at __, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
practice case such as the local rules, customs, and characteristics of
the community where the professional practices.2 °3
As previously stated, one of the original reasons why the local-
ity rule was applied to professional malpractice was to protect
rural practitioners from being held to an unreasonably high stan-
dard of care. °4 Before the development of sophisticated commu-
nication, transportation, and research systems, a rural lawyer was
truly isolated from the centers where law and practice methods
were advancing. 205 Therefore, the protection provided by the
locality rule was justified. However, the original rationale for the
locality rule of protecting the rural lawyer is no longer as persua-
sive as it once was.20 6 Today, when a rural lawyer has a legal ques-
tion, he can commission a legal research company, tap into a
computer database using long distance lines, or call an attorney
who specializes in such cases.207 In addition, the rural lawyer can
computerize his or her office practice relatively inexpensively.20 8
Furthermore, there are an unlimited supply of resource materials
available. 20 9 Therefore, the original problems which prompted
the creation of the locality rule have in many ways been alleviated.
There may still exist, however, a basis for the distinction
between a rural and metropolitan attorney.210 In most cases, the
rural attorney is a solo or a small firm practitioner. 211 A rural attor-
ney may be limited by economics because often, he or she is one of
the only lawyers in town, and thus must be a general practitioner
to make a living. As a small firm or solo practitioner, the rural
attorney does not have the time, money, or energy to be a master
in every area of the law.212 It is also likely that he or she lacks the
203. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g (1965). For the pertinent
excerpt from the Restatement, see supra note 42.
205. See Pitt v. Yalden, 98 Eng. Rep. 74, 75 (K.B. 1767) (they were country attorneys
and probably did not know that the issue was settled).
206. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 333-34.
207. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 86, at 35 (contemporary systems of communication
and legal education are clearly improved over past means of exchanging information); cf.
Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, -, 349 A.2d 245, 249 (1975).
For the pertinent quotation from Shilkret, see supra note 53.
208. Mazza, Chipping Away at Computer Resistance, 2 COMPLEAT LAWYER 10-14
(Winter 1985).
209. Kregel & Crowther, Win With the Right Library Services, I COMPLEAT LAWYER
18, 20 (Fall 1984).
210. HOUSTON CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at xiii ("urban bar and the communities of
rural practitioners differ profoundly").
211. See TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 16-17 (solo
and small firm practices are more likely than large firms to be located in rural setting). For a
discussion of rural lawyers in North Dakota, see infra notes 244-295 and accompanying text.
212. Chaplin, supra note 186, at 379 (three factors which are to be considered in
undertaking employment in an area where one is not already qualified are preparation,
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financial resources or the support staff to handle complex litiga-
tion. In addition, the rural attorney may not have the big client to
provide a steady and certain cash flow. Therefore, an important
distinction between a rural and metropolitan lawyer is that the
rural attorney does not have as great an opportunity to specialize
as does a metropolitan attorney in a medium to large firm.21 3 Con-
sequently, due to the economics of a rural practice, where a law-
yer practices is still a distinguishing characteristic.2 14
Specialization among lawyers is becoming increasingly com-
mon.2 15 Nevertheless, official recognition that certain lawyers are
specialists has been resisted by a large portion of the profession.2 16
Only twelve states currently have legislative programs for official
recognition of specialists in various areas of the law.217 Unlike the
time, and cost); see also, Chaplin, The Dilemmas of Specialization, HOUSTON CONFERENCE,
supra note 23, at 304, 311-12. The author explains how difficult it is to be a general
practitioner:
It is becoming more and more common for lawyers to affiliate themselves in
larger and larger law partnerships organized along fairly rigid department lines
such as litigation, tax, estate planning and probate, corporate, and real estate.
There is simply too much information and practical experience to be obtained in
each of these areas to make it efficient, let alone cost-effective, for a lawyer to
handle competently more than the most mundane problems in more than a very
few areas of practice at any given time.
Id. at 311.
213. See L. PATTERSON AND E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 249-50 (1971).
The authors explain why a solo or small firm may be at a disadvantage in modern legal
practice. According to Patterson and Cheatham, a lawyer presented with a case which he or
she is not competent to handle has three options. Id. at 249. One, he or she can decline the
case, but this is inconvenient for the client and unprofitable for the attorney. Id. Two, he
or she can accept the case and become competent through study. Id. This option is time-
consuming and costly. Third, he or she can accept the case, and with his client's consent,
associate a specialist. Id. For large law firms, Patterson and Cheatham recognize that the
last option is quite workable because they have the luxury of having in-house specialists. Id.
The authors conclude: "The lawyer practicing alone or in a small firm has no such self-
sufficient competence. He must go outside if his clients are to be adequately represented."
Id. This situation is common for rural lawyers. See D. MEISELMAN, supra note 86, § 2:11 at
35 (contemporary systems of communication and legal education are clearly improved over
past means of exchanging information, but specialization is still far more common in
metropolitan areas than in rural areas).
214. Cf., HOUSTON CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 233. In her statement, Alice
Daniel, Professor of Law, Georgetown University, emphasized: "We must not impose "big
firm" standards on the practitioner who has far fewer resources available. We must not
define competence too expensively." Id.
215. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 253, at 325 (many attorneys have
become specialists).
216. See Chaplin, supra note 186, at 374 ("most lawyers will readily agree that most of
the opposition to formal recognition of specialists comes from the sole practitioners and
small law firms"). General practitioners are the core of the legal profession. TASK FORCE
ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 1. They outnumber every other
segment of the estimated 649,000 lawyers in the United States. Id.
217. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at 21:4001 (twelve states had specialist
certification plans by 1983: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah); R. MALLEN & V.
LEVIT, supra note 5, § 253, at 324 (an increasing number of states recognize specialists
under state bar certification); see also, R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 253, at 330
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medical profession, there is no national program for certification of
specialists, other than patent, trademark, and admiralty law.21 8
Due to the increasing complexity of the law, however, unofficial
specialization often occurs without official recognition. 21 9 As a
result, courts may be reluctant to hold specialists to a higher stan-
dard of care, because without official standards by which to mea-
sure the qualifications of a specialists, identifying a specialty and
fashioning a standard of care on a case by case basis is a demanding
and uncertain process.22 °
The medical profession has dealt with the problem of compe-
tence by abandoning the locality rule and adopting a national sys-
tem of accreditation according to area of expertise. 221  As
progressive as the medical profession is in this area, however, the
system is not without problems of its own, such as a lack of integra-
tion and geographic maldistribution, compounded by a shortage of
generalists. 222 Although legal specialization is not as developed,
("[t]he task of cataloging specialties must be done on a case by case basis by the court
considering such recognition or certification as exists by the state bar, the American Bar
Association, lawyers' organizations, and.. .the legal community.").
218. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2 at 21:4001. The ABA asserts that recognition
and regulation of specialists is the province of state entities that regulate the practice of law,
and that the lawyers' participation in such plans should be voluntary. Id. In 1979, the ABA
adopted the Model Plan of Specialization which is intended for potential adoption by the
states. Id. at 01:5201. The LAWYERS' MANUAL provides a brief synopsis of the Model Plan's
principles:
It is voluntary; it sets minimum standards that must be met by a lawyer seeking
to be recognized as a specialist and to hold himself out as such, while allowing for
adoption of higher standards for any given speciality; it does not require
examinations, but leaves the states the option of requiring examinations for any
or all specialties; it safeguards the right of specialists and nonspecialists alike to
practice in any field of law; it is administered by a board appointed by the state's
supreme court; it provides for input from nonlawyers; and it names participants
in the plan as the sole source of financing for the plan.
Id. at 21:4007. Both the Model Code and the Model Rules allow lawyers to hold themselves
out as specialists in the fields of admiralty, trademark, and patent law, without state con-
trols, where a holding out as a specialist has been historically permitted. MODEL CODE,
supra note 20, DR 2-105; MODEL RULES, supra note 20, Rule 7.4.
219. LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at 21:4003. The editors noted that "[bloth
before and while the merits... of recognition and regulation of specialization have been
debated.. .in the ABA and in the states, de facto specialization by lawyers has flourished."
Id. (quoting Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Education, 1954
Midyear Report, 79 ABA REPORTS 582, 584 (1954)) (due to the complexity of the law and
demand for experts, lawyers have been limiting their practice to specific areas of law,
especially in the last ten years).
220. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 253, at 330-31.
221. For a discussion of the uniformity of medical standards now existing across the
nation, see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
222. Tarlov, Credentialing: Natural Evolution of the Medical Profession, HOUSTON
CONFERENCE, supra note 23, at 406, 414. Tarlov stated that specialization has undesirable
side effects. Id. Unlike general practitioners, Tarlov noted that specialists often do not have
a genuine concern for each individual patient, and often are most zealous only when an
unusual case arises. Id. Consequently, Tarlov believed that most medical services should
be handled by generalists, and since there was a shortage of generalists and a surplus of
specialists, a definite problem existed. Id. In addition, Tarlov recognized that specialists
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potential problems with specialization as applied to the legal pro-
fession have been identified.223 For instance, the general standard
of care calls for lawyers to possess a reasonable level of skill and
knowledge and to exercise a reasonable degree of care.224 While
specialization functions to increase an attorney's level of skill and
knowledge, it may have little effect on the degree of care he or she
in fact exercises. 225 Therefore, a specialist may be just as likely to
make an error due to lack of care, i.e., negligence, as would a gen-
eral practitioner.226 Perhaps the uniformity that would accompany
the application of national standards to the legal profession is not,
at present, in the best interests of the profession due to the varia-
tion of rules, laws, and customs among the jurisdictions.
Rural lawyers and small firm general practitioners in urban
areas also suffer the same lack of opportunity to specialize, thereby
putting them at a disadvantage when held to the same standard of
care as large firm lawyers from urban areas.227 Large firm lawyers
have the opportunity to limit their practice to certain areas,
allowing them to conserve time, money, and energy.228 Until
recently, specialization was rarely an issue concerning the stan-
dard of care in legal malpractice cases. 229 The courts, however,
have begun to hold those who represent themselves as specialists
to a .higher standard of care; however, it is not yet a majority
rule. 230 The adoption of a higher standard of care for specialists by
the courts may achieve the same end as the original locality rule -
require a large population base. Id. Therefore, Tarlov concluded that a geographic
maldistribution of physicians' services has resulted, with a concentration of physicians in
metropolitan areas. Id.
223. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 86, at 26-27. Meiselman stated that specialization may
not guarantee quality services since many errors are due to carelessness rather than lack of
knowledge. Id. at 26. As an example, Meiselman stated that certified specialists are just as
likely to miss a statute of limitations or fail to examine title to realty as is a general
practitioner. Id. Therefore, Meiselman concluded that a specialization standard may
actually increase malpractice suits by raising the expectations of the public. Id. Cf.
LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 2, at 21:4004 (there are many unresolved issues concerning
legal specialization).
224. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 341 (D.C. 1982) (lawyer must exercise
reasonable care and skill).
225. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 86, at 26. For a discussion of Meiselman's assertion,
see supra note 223.
226. Id.
227. See MELONE, BRAUD & OUCH, NORTH DAKOTA LAWYERS: MAPPING THE SOCIO-
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 3 (1975) ("greater opportunity to specialize seems to be the best
factor in explaining this difference between firm and solo practitioners").
228. L. PATTERSON AND E. CHEATHAM, supra note 213, at 249-50 (large law firms
have the luxury of having in-house specialists).
229. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 253, at 328.
230. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 86, at 24. Meiselman notes: "As with medical
malpractice cases involving specialists one would reasonably anticipate that the specialist in
a particular field of legal practice is held to a higher standard than the general practitioner.
However, this idea has yet to be accepted as established principal." Id.
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protecting those with fewer resources and opportunities (general-
ists) from being held to the same standard as those who have
greater resources and opportunities (specialists).23 '
Some courts have combined some of the geographical limita-
tions with those discussed above to fashion a very specific standard
of care.232 The Washington Supreme Court included a geographi-
cal limitation and a higher standard for specialists in the standard
of care for lawyers to make the standard more specific.233 The
Washington rule designates the state as the locality of practice, in
addition to differentiating between general practitioners and spe-
cialists. 234 This combination serves to provide a uniform standard
across the state, preventing pockets of incompetency from devel-
235oping. The effect of such a formulation is similar to that of the
basic locality rule, in that it protects rural lawyers, who are most
often general practitioners, from being held to the same standard
of care applied to specialists.236 Furthermore, the "in the state"
and "specialists" standard combination does not limit expert wit-
nesses to those who practice in the same community or county as
the defendant as does the basic locality rule. 23 7 Finally, the "in the
state" element of this combination prevents the importation of
expert witnesses from foreign jurisdictions who may expound a
standard of care of which the defendant attorney is unfamiliar. 238
Therefore, combining a geographical limitation with a specialist
standard may give courts the necessary flexibility to handle legal
231. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 332-33. Mallen and Levit
emphasize that rural attorneys should not be given special treatment. Id., § 254, at 334.
They also state that local customs should not dictate the degree of skill, knowledge, and care
required. Id. In order to alleviate the possible unfairness of a uniform standard, Mallen and
Levit advocate that rural lawyers who cannot specialize be held to the standard of care as
general practitioners and that urban lawyers who specialize should be held to the higher
degree of skill, knowledge, and care that they profess to possess. Id.
232. See Bent v. Green, 39 Conn. Supp. 416, -, 466 A.2d 322, 325 (1983) (in the same
or similar locality, in the same line of practice, and under similar circumstances); Rorrer v.
Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, -, 329 S.E.2d 355, 366 (1985) (in the same or similar locality under
similar circumstances); Lenius v. King, 294 N.W.2d 912, 913 (S.D. 1980) (same type of
practice in the same or similar locality under similar circumstances).
233. See Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wash. 2d 854, -., 601 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (1979) (lawyer is
held to the degree of care and skill possessed by a reasonable lawyer in this jurisdiction; one
who holds himself out as specialist will be held to standard of care of other specialists in that
area).
234. Id.
235. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 336.
236. Cf. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334 (attorney from a small
community, who of necessity must generalize his or her practice, ought not be compared
with a metropolitan attorney who limits his or her practice to one area of law).
237. Cf. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 337 ("[b]y adopting a statewide
standard of care, it is unnecessary to inject locality into the instructions given to the
jury ... ").
238. See Note, supra note 14, at 406 (statewide standard of care limits outside expert
testimony).
malpractice actions, while remaining "fair" to the practitioners
within the given geographical area.
B. SUMMARY OF THE VARIOUS STANDARDS UTILIZED BY
COURTS IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
As illustrated by the above analysis, it appears that courts have
several options for tailoring a more specific standard of care for
lawyers. There are, however, numerous variations to this general
rule which make the standard more specific. Initially, a court may
prefer to use a general standard containing no limiting factors as a
method for encouraging uniformity in the standard of care. 239 A
court can then add geographical elements such as "in the locality,"
"in a similar locality or community," or "in the state" to the gen-
eral rule.24° Courts can also choose a very broad limiting element
such as "under the circumstances," which may include geographi-
cal factors, to particularize the standard of care for lawyers.
24 1
Furthermore, courts can distinguish between lawyers with differ-
ent levels of skill by holding specialists to a higher standard of care
than general practitioners.242 As a final alternative, a court can
apply a standard of care which contains a combination of limiting
factors to fashion a very specific standard of care. 43 Therefore, a
court has the ability to fashion a standard which it believes will
give them the necessary flexibility, while remaining fair to the
attorneys subject to the rule.
It is not the objective of this Note to judge which geographical
element, if any, is the best, since each has its advantages and disad-
vantages depending on the nature of the jurisdiction and the cir-
cumstances of each case. The next section will illustrate how
courts can choose the appropriate formula to fit the needs of a
jurisdiction. Rather than attempt to apply every geographical limi-
tation to all demographic possibilities, the following section will
use the legal profession of North Dakota as a model, and attempt
to fashion a formula most suitable to this state's needs.
239. For a discussion of jurisdictions utilizing a general standard of care, see supra note
94 and accompanying text.
240. For a discussion of the basic locality rule, see supra notes 112-26 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the "similar locality or community" element, see
supra notes 127-60 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the "in the state or
jurisdiction" element, see supra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
241. For a discussion of the "under the circumstances" element see supra notes 172-96
and accompanying text.
242. For a discussion of the specialists standard, see supra notes 197-231 and
accompanying text.
243. For a discussion of jurisdictions which have combined a number of elements to
create a specific standard of care, see supra notes 175-76, 232-38 and accompanying text.
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IV. NORTH DAKOTA AS A MODEL FOR ANALYZING
GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATIONS OF THE LOCALITY
RULE
A. PROFILE OF NORTH DAKOTA AND ITS LEGAL SYSTEM
North Dakota is generally considered a rural state,244 yet it
contains three standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs).
245
This contrast makes North Dakota a useful model to demonstrate
how various geographical limitations of the general standard of
care can affect the legal profession.246 This section will attempt to
apply several geographic limitations to the standard of care for
lawyers in light of the demographics of the legal profession in
North Dakota. Unfortunately, there is very little statistical infor-
mation available in North Dakota on legal malpractice.247 Fur-
244. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA BUREAU OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC
RESEARCH & NORTH DAKOTA OFFICE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ASSISTANCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF NORTH DAKOTA 8 (2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT). In
1980, of the 652,717 persons residing in North Dakota 51% were classified as rural and 49 %
were classified as urban. Id. The STATISTICAL ABSTRACT defines rural as "[p]ersons living
in areas with less than 2,500 population." Id. The source for the STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
data on the urban-rural composition of North Dakota is the U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION (1980). STATISTICAL ABSTRACT at 8.
The percentage of rural population in North Dakota has been steadily declining since the
first census in 1870. Id. In 1870, North Dakota was 100% rural; in 1920, 86% rural; in 1950,
73% rural; and in 1980, North Dakota's population was 51% rural. U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION (various years). Thus, it is
highly likely that by 1988, North Dakota has become an urban state. Nonetheless, it may be
safely stated that North Dakota is one of the most rural states in the nation.
245. B. CURRAN, A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE
1980s 238, 242 (1985) [hereinafter STATISTICAL PROFILE]. A Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area (hereinafter SMSA) is a geographic area designated by the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1987 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 888 (107th ed. 1986). The definition of an SMSA is, "one of a large
population nucleus, together with adjacent communities which have a high degree of
economic and social integration with that nucleus." Id. For a geographic area to qualify as
an SMSA, it must include: 1) one city of 50,000 or more, or 2) a Census Bureau defined
urban area of at least 50,000 and a total SMSA population of at least 100,000 (75,000 in New
England). Id.
246. North Dakota's population is about half rural and half urban. U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS POPULATION (1980). Therefore, it would
seem likely that there is a fairly substantial percentage of the legal profession that practices
in rural areas, as well as a substantial percentage that practice in cities. Thus, because
North Dakota continues to have a substantially agrarian economy and culture, perhaps the
factors that supported the basic locality rule still exist in this state. Lawyers practicing in
rural areas may not have the resources or opportunities to gain experience that their urban
counterparts enjoy. This is the starting premise for this section, based on these general
assumptions.
247. State statistics on legal malpractice in North Dakota are unavailable. A survey of
North Dakota cases at the appellate level also does not provide an accurate profile of legal
malpractice cases since many cases that go to trial are never appealed. More importantly,
the bulk of legal malpractice claims never even go to trial, but rather are settled out of
court. North Dakota does, however, have a statute which requires insurance companies to
file reports on all legal malpractice claims, but the insurance companies do not substantially
comply with the law. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-01-06 (Supp. 1987) (professional liability
insurance carriers required to file reports for each claim). Insurers did submit 15 report
forms to the North Dakota Insurance Department in 1986, but most are substantially
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thermore, some of the North Dakota statistics are more than ten
years old.24 Therefore, for the purpose of this Note, national sta-
tistics of the legal profession will at times be substituted for analyti-
cal comparison."'
While North Dakota is usually considered a rural state, most
lawyers are in fact located in cities.25 ° Therefore, the small-town
lawyer is not the norm. 5 ' However, what is considered a city in
North Dakota, a population of 10,000 or more, may be only a town
or suburb in a metropolitan state.252 North Dakota has only three
areas that are considered by statisticians as metropolitan areas.
These areas are in the proximity of Fargo, Grand Forks, and Bis-
marck.253 Only one of these cities, Fargo, has a population over
incomplete. Letter from JoAnn Underwood, paralegal, N.D. Ins. Dept., to Dwain
Fagerlund (Jan. 25, 1988) (enclosed legal malpractice claims reports).
The reasons for noncompliance with the statute may be that such information could be
damaging to the reputation of individuals with claims against them, to the legal profession,
or to the insurance industry. In addition, it may be that the state does not strictly enforce
the statute because the insurance companies may threaten to pull out of a nominal state
such as North Dakota, leaving practitioners with no insurance protection. Most insurance
companies do, however, submit national statistics to the American Bar Association (ABA) on
legal malpractice claims. PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 23, at 1-2.
Therefore, for purposes of this Note, inferences shall be drawn from national statistics for
analysis of the North Dakota Bar because they are the only available source.
248. See MELONE, BRAUD & OUCH, supra note 227.
249. National statistics on legal malpractice will be taken from these sources: PROFILE
OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 23, at 20-22; STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 245, at
439-42, 554-55; B. CURRAN, THE 1985 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT
4, 111-13 (1986) [hereinafter 1985 SUPPLEMENT]; TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL
PRACTITIONER supra note 187, at 7. Even on a national basis, it is difficult to compile
statistics on legal malpractice claims. Until the ABA convinced a large group of insurance
carriers that such statistics were valuable for loss prevention, the carriers were very
uncooperative. See PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 23, at 1-2. The reporter
of PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE noted that insurance carriers were unwilling to
disclose information to the customer-based Task Force on Legal Malpractice. PROFILE OF
LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 23, at 1-2. The reporter also noted that the information
that was available was very limited because it was organized by each carrier in an
independent format, making aggregation and comparison impossible. Id. Even after
extensive discussion and negotiation, the ABA could not get a compete consensus for
cooperation by the insurance industry because two major insurers of large law firms did not
report data to the ABA. Id. at 20.
250. MELONE, BRAUD & OUCH, supra note 227, at I ("two-thirds of the lawyers
practice in the ten cities of 10,000 or more, containing only 56 percent of the state's
population, but fewer than 7 percent practice in communities under 1,000 even though
these areas contain over 18 percent of the total population").
251. MELONE, BRAUD & OUCH, supra note 227, at 1.
252. Cf. TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 18 ("small
firm in an urban setting may be a large firm in a rural setting").
253. STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 245, at 439. The "standard metropolitan
statistical areas" (SMSAs) in North Dakota include: a) Fargo-Moorhead/Cass and Clay
counties, b) Grand Forks-East Grand Forks-Air Force Base/Polk and Grand Forks counties,
and c) Bismarck-Mandan/Morton and Burleigh counties. Id. Note that the SMSAs do not
include Minot, Jamestown, Dickinson, Williston, Wahpeton, Valley City, Devils Lake, or
Grafton. Id at 440. In 1980, these cities had the following populations: a) Minot-32,843;
b) Jamestown-16,280; c) Dickinson-15,924; d) Williston-13,336; e) Wahpeton-9,064; f) Valley
City-7,774; g) Devils Lake-7,442; and h) Grafton-5,293. 1987 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK
OF FACTS 249 (1986). In 1980, 68% of the lawyers in North Dakota outside the SMSAs
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50,000.254 Thus, compared to a metropolitan state such as New
York, even North Dakota's metropolitan lawyers are somewhat
rural. Nevertheless, fifty-seven percent of the lawyers in North
Dakota practice in the above-mentioned metropolitan areas.
2 55
Therefore, the majority of the lawyers in North Dakota do not
practice in a rural setting.
Seventy-five percent of the lawyers in North Dakota are solo
or small firm practitioners.25 6 It is difficult for solo or small firm
practitioners to limit their practices to one area of the law for eco-
nomical reasons, 257 and thus, most North Dakota lawyers are prob-
ably general practitioners. In addition, small towns do not have
the population base to support large firms or legal specialsts, and
specialization is more common in metropolitan areas.258 There-
fore, it is probable that most rural North Dakota lawyers are solo
or small firm general practitioners.259 Furthermore, since most
lawyers in North Dakota do not practice in small towns260 or in
large firms,2 6 1 it is likely that most urban lawyers are solo or small
firm general practitioners as well.
Another characteristic of the North Dakota legal profession is
that one-half of North Dakota lawyers in private practice belong to
(Bismarck-Mandan, Grand Forks-East Grand Forks-Air Force Base, Fargo-Moorhead)
practiced in firms of three or less members. STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 245, at 442.
Solo practitioners comprised 43% of this group and firms of two to three lawyers comprised
26%. Id. The rest of the lawyers practicing outside the SMSAs practiced in firms employing
four to ten lawyers. Id.
254. STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 245, at 439.
255. Id. at 440.
256. 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 249, at 112. Nationally, 49% of private
practitioners are solo practitioners, 22% practice in firms of two to five, and 29% practice in
firms of six or more. PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 23, at 20. In North
Dakota, 41% of the private practitioners are solo practitioners, 34 % practice in firms of two
to five, and 25% practice in firms of six or more. 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 249, at 112.
For purposes of this Note, a small firm is defined as a firm having two to five members. This
corresponds to the categories used by the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers'
Professional Liability in PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 23, at 20.
257. L. PATTERSON AND E. CHEATHAM, supra note 213, at 249-50 (solo practitioner
has little opportunity to specialize).
258. Gillen, supra note 114, at 290 (specialization is common in metropolitan areas
compared with the more generalized practice in rural areas).
259. TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 16-17. The
report concluded that because definitions are ambiguous, urban lawyers are equated with a
specialized practice and rural lawyers are equated with a general practice. Id. This
definition does not account for the fact that the majority of solo practitioners practice in
central cities. Id. Nevertheless, solo and small firm practices are more likely than large
firms to be located in a rural area. Id.
260. MELONE, BRAUD & OUGH, supra note 227, at 1 ("two-thirds of the lawyers
practice in the 10 cities of 10,000 or more, containing only 56 percent of the state's
population, but fewer than 7 percent practice in communities under 1,000 even though
these areas contain over 18 percent of the total population").
261. 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 249, at 112. In North Dakota, 41% of the private
practitioners are solo practitioners, 34% practice in firms of two to five, and 25% practice in
firms of six or more. Id.
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partnerships,26 2 and thus have: a) the luxury of having other attor-
neys within their office to consult or associate with on the case;
b) the opportunity to specialize somewhat; and c) an increased
ability to pool capital for research resources, support staff, auto-
mated office equipment, and the ability to absorb initial discovery
costs. The percentage of the partnership form of practice is signifi-
cantly higher in North Dakota than it is nationally.26 3 Further-
more, only a small percentage of the lawyers in North Dakota
practice in a truly rural setting.264 Moreover, in North Dakota,
lawyers as a whole have relatively equivalent financial resources
26 5
and ability ratings, regardless of the size or location of their prac-
tice.266 According to the statistics discussed above, it therefore
appears that in North Dakota, most of the lawyers stand on similar
footing. Therefore, the legal profession in North Dakota does not
display the patterns of stratification that exist in metropolitan
states. 7
262. 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 249, at 112. Fifty-nine percent of North Dakota
lawyers enjoy the partnership form of practice which allows the pooling of resources and
limitation of practice to a narrower area of law. Id. at 112. Only 41% of the North Dakota
private practitioners are solo practitioners. Id. at 112.
263. Id. at 4. Only 53% of lawyers at the national level practice in partnership
compared to 59% in North Dakota. Id. at 112.
264. While two-thirds of the lawyers in North Dakota practice in citites of 10,000 or
more, and only 7% of North Dakota's lawyers practice in communitites of 1,000 or less,
statistics are not available for the number of lawyers that practice in communitites of more
than 1,000, but less than 10,000. See, MELONE, BRAUD & OUGH, supra note 227, at 1 ("two-
thirds of the lawyers practice in the 10 cities of 10,000 or more, containing only 56 percent
of the state's population, but fewer than 7 percent practice in communitites under 1,000
even though these ares contain over 18% of the total population."). Thus, the available
statistics may overstate the urban character of the legal profession in North Dakota.
265. MELONE, BRAUD & OUCH, supra note 227, at 7. ("North Dakota . . . solo
practitioners do not differ from firm attorneys in their net worth").
266. Id. The authors noted:
Ability ratings [from the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory], like net worth,
seem to bear little relation to style of practice, though a higher percentage
[52%] of large firm attorneys have "A" ratings than do small firm attorneys
[42%] and the differences are statistically significant. But the solo practitioners,
with nearly 47 percent "A" ratings, are five percentage points above the small
firm lawyers [42%] and five percentage points below the large firm members.
Id.
The author of this Note has reservations as to the research methods used by Martindale-
Hubbell company to compile their ability ratings. Martindale-Hubbell uses a subjective
questionnaire which is not distributed according to proper statistical methods. Unfortu-
nately, there exist no better sources for such information.
267. MELONE, BRAUD & OUGH, supra note 227, at 3. The authors noted that "[tihe
legal profession, like medicine, stratifies its members into differentiated classes." Id. The
authors relied on statistics and conclusions by legal sociologist Jerome Carlin in stating that
in metropolitan areas, solo practitioners are considered a lower class of lawyers because
they come from less-advantaged backgrounds, attend less prestigious law schools, often
have undistinguished academic records, deal with less desirable clientele, and earn less
money performing the "dirty work" of the profession. Id. The authors compared the legal
profession in North Dakota to the urban research and concluded that "[t]he style-of-
practice figures point to a minimal amount of internal bar conflict in North Dakota." Id. at
4. The authors further stated that "there is a distinctive pattern of homogeneity among
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In order to fashion a specific standard of care that serves the
best interest of society and the legal profession, it is useful to
pinpoint the group of lawyers most prone to allegations of mal-
practice. The available statistics do not distinguish lawyers accord-
ing to the rural or urban character of their locality of practice.
Therefore, it is necessary to analogize from statistics distinguishing
lawyers on the basis of firm size. Comparison can then be made
under the rough assumption that generally, most rural lawyers are
general practitioners, while most specialists practice in metropoli-
tan areas.268
B. NATIONAL STATISTICS
Although North Dakota statistics on legal malpractice are cur-
rently unavailable, 269 there are national statistics.2 ° Therefore,
when discussing legal malpractice in North Dakota, this Note will,
of necessity, apply the national statistics on the legal profession.
According to the 1980 national statistics on the legal profes-
sion, solo practitioners make up 49% of all private practitioners,
yet are responsible for only 35% of all legal malpractice claims.2 7'
Small firm lawyers, however, make up 22% of the private practi-
tioners and are responsible for 44% of all legal malpractice
claims. 2  Large firms comprise 29% of all private practitioners
and account for only 22% of all claims.273 Therefore, the ABA
Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability, in its
report titled Profile of Legal Malpractice, concluded that "firms of
two to five lawyers produce a larger proportion of reported claims
asserted against attorneys than would be explained by their fre-
quency among all sizes of firms."'2 74 It is not clear, however, why
small firms are more susceptible to legal malpractice claims than
solo practitioners or large firms.2 75
North Dakota lawyers which differentiates them from the urban attorneys upon whom
most research has heretofore been focused." Id. at 7.
268. TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 16-17 (urban
lawyers are equated with a specialized practice and rural lawyers are equated with a
general practice).
269. For a discussion of the unavailability of the. North Dakota legal malpractice
statistics, see supra note 247 and accompanying text.
270. For various sources of national legal malpractice statistics, see supra note 249 and
accompanying text.
271. PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 23, at 20. This study incorporated
general statistics on lawyers compiled in 1980. STATISTICAL PROFILE, supra note 245.
272. PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 23, at 20.
273. Id. A problem with this statistic is that "[t]wo major insurers of large law firms
have not reported data to the ABA." Id.
274. Id.
275. The reporter for the ABA study did not attempt to state the cause for the
disparities based on firm size. Id. at 20.
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Nationally, the statistics indicated the following types of mal-
practice claims: 1) substantive errors - 44%; 2) administrative
errors - 26%; 3) client-related errors - 16%; 4) intentional mal-
practice - 12%; and 5) other errors - 2%.276 The reporter for
Profile of Legal Malpractice concluded that, "[i]n general, the fre-
quency of administrative errors seems to decrease with [an
increase in] firms size. . .[and] [t]he proportion of intentional
wrongs increases steadily with firm size, reaching a maximum in
large firms of nearly double the rate for all reported claims. "277
Within the other two categories, "substantive" and "client-
related" errors, the percentage of all claims remained fairly consis-
tent with each firm size. 8
In applying the national statistics discussed above to the
demographics of the North Dakota legal profession, two areas war-
rant additional analysis. First, on the national level, the small firm
lawyers make up twenty-two percent of all lawyers, yet are
responsible for forty-four percent of all legal malpractice claims.
2 7 9
In North Dakota, small firm lawyers comprise thirty-four percent
of the legal profession. 280 Therefore, if the national ratio holds
true in North Dakota, small firm lawyers would have the highest
ratio of malpractice claims and would be the class of lawyers that
the standard of care ought to specifically address. Perhaps this
subset of the legal profession is being held to an unreasonably high
standard of care due to the circumstances of the groups' practice.
Small firm practitioners may be practicing in communities with a
large population of legal specialists, thereby subjecting them to a
level of excellence which they cannot reasonably achieve. If so,
perhaps the courts should add a limiting element such as "under
276. Id. at 21. The ABA study explained the basis for the categories used to divide up
the claims:
Among administrative errors, almost half (43%) are due to failure to calendar
properly. Additionally, 21% of these alleged errors are attributed to
procrastination in performances or lack of follow-up. Among substantive errors,
failure to know or properly apply the law (23%), inadequate discovery of facts or
inadequate investigation (21%), planning error in choice of procedures (19%),
and failure to know or ascertain deadline correctly (16%) are leading offenders.
Of client relations errors, over half (55%) are attributed to failure to obtain
client's consent or to inform client and more than one third (36%) to failure to
follow client's instructions. Intentional wrongs are primarily split between
malicious prosecution or abuse of process (33%) and fraud (33%).
Id. at 6.
277. Id. at 21.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 20.
280. 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 249, at 112.
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similar circumstances, "21 or a higher standard for legal special-
ists, 282 to counterbalance any unfair disadvantage placed upon
small firm practitioners. Such limiting factors separate lawyers
who specialize from those who are generalists and holds each par-
ticular class to a standard of care that each group is capable of
achieving.
There may be a problem peculiar to small firms, however, that
ought to be dealt with by means other than litigation. A possible
explanation for the high rate of malpractice claims made against
small firms may be that small firm practitioners are attempting to
specialize in certain areas without having the time and resources
necessary to attain the skill and knowledge necessary to be special-
ists in that given area. If such is the case, then the standard of
care should not be altered to accommodate small firm practition-
ers. To do so would allow lawyers to practice in areas in which
they are not competent without having fear of liability for their
mistakes. This would be unfair to society. If small firm practition-
ers are attempting to compete in areas in which they are incompe-
tent, they should be held liable for the injury they cause and
should be forced to compensate their clients accordingly. There-
fore, if this is the problem causing small firm attorneys to be
responsible for a disproportionate level of claims, the solution must
come from a source other than the reformulation of the standard
of care.
C. GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS
In considering what method is needed to best address the sta-
tistical disparity of the small firm lawyer to malpractice claims, one
must first consider whether implementing a geographical limita-
tion within the standard of care for lawyers would serve to protect
lawyers practicing in firms of two to five members from unfair
standards, while still serving the best interests of the public by
encouraging quality legal services. The legal profession in North
281. For a discussion of the "under similar circumstances" variation, see supra notes
172-196 and accompanying text.
282. For a discussion of the specialists standard, see supra notes 197-238 and
accompanying text.
283. See Chaplin, supra note 186, at 379 (three factors which are to be considered in
undertaking employment in an area where one is not already qualified are preparation,
time, and cost); see also, Chaplin, supra note 212, at 311-12 (too much information and
experience is needed in each area of the law to make it efficient and cost-effective for a
lawyer to competently handle more than the most mundane problems in very few areas of
practice).
704 [Vol. 64:661
2814Dakota is homogeneous, and therefore, it is difficult to statisti-
cally differentiate between a rural small firm lawyer and an urban
small firm lawyer since a small firm practitioner does not necessar-
ily practice in a rural area. Therefore, in North Dakota the locality
of practice does not explain the large number of malpractice
claims against this group, and adding a geographical limitation to
the standard of care would be overinclusive.
If the locality of practice does not explain the disproportionate
number of malpractice claims made against lawyers in firms of two
to five practitioners, then perhaps there are other circumstances
which affect this group more than others. 8 5 If the problem is that
small firm practitioners are practicing in communities which have
a large population of specialists and the customary level of skill is
extraordinarily high, then the addition of an "under the circum-
stances" element or a higher standard for specialists would protect
small firm general practitioners from being held to the same stan-
dard of care as the specialists in the community where they prac-
tice. In this situation, a bare locality rule would prejudice rather
than protect the small firm practitioner because it would group all
lawyers in the same locality, including the specialists, into one
class.286 Unlike a geographical limitation, an "under the circum-
stances" or a higher standard for specialists protects the public
from misrepresentation.28 7 In other words, a rule which measures
liability by claimed expertise ensures that "what you see is what
you get."
If the reason behind the large number of claims attributable
to small firm lawyers is that they are attempting to specialize with-
out having sufficient resources to do so, then no limiting element
added to the general standard of care would provide this group
with added protection, nor should it. Small firm specialists ought
to be held to the higher standard of care to which they represent
themselves to be capable of attaining. If small firm practitioners
are attempting to specialize without the necessary preparation,
then the malpractice claims against this group are justified and the
284. MELONE, BRAUD & OUGH, supra note 227, at 7.
285. The following examples are for illustrative purposes only and this Note does not
attempt to exhaust the possibilities of the causes for the disproportionate number of
malpractice claims made against lawyers in firms of two to five practitioners.
286. For a discussion of how a locality rule can prejudice rather than protect an
attorney, see supra note 112-21 and accompanying text.
287. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 334 (practitioner who of necessity
must generalize his or her practice ought not be compared to an attorney with the
opportunity to limit his or her practice to one area of law).
288. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 86, at 24-27.
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judicial system should function to compensate those who are
injured by this practice. The solution to this problem lies not with
the judicial system, but rather with programs designed to enhance
the competence of this group so that they may provide the quality
of services that are demanded by clients.289 If this is not possible,
then lawyers who are not competent to handle certain types of
cases have a duty to refer them to one who is competent in that
specific area of law.29 °
The second issue which must be addressed when applying the
national statistics to the legal profession in North Dakota is why
administrative errors increase as the size of the law firm decreases,
and how these errors can best be avoided.291 The ABA study, Pro-
file of Legal Malpractice, includes two types of behavior within
the definition of "administrative error." Forty-three percent of
the administrative errors resulted from failure to calendar prop-
erly and twenty-one percent involved procrastination.29 2 The
question arises whether the locality of practice contributes to
these problems. Since administrative errors include procrastina-
tion and failure to calendar properly, the most likely cause for
administrative error is inefficient office practice.293 Out of neces-
sity, larger firms most likely have more elaborate systems for office
management. Although a rural practice may be more prone to
administrative errors because of their small size and financial con-
straints, there seems to be no rational reason why a simple organi-
zational method would not work just as well on a smaller scale.
Even the most minimal support staff, systematic planning, and a
simple "tickler" file would serve to alleviate these types of admin-
istrative errors.
Unlike a substantive error that is related to access to research
resources or experience in litigation strategy, administrative error
is not the result of a deficiency in resources, except perhaps sup-
port staff. Because the legal profession in North Dakota is so
homogeneous, location of practice:does not indicate why adminis-
trative errors are more common to small practices. Therefore,
there appears to be no logical reason why administrative error
289. For a d iscussion of methods to enhance the competence of lawyers, see infra
notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
290. For a discussion of the duty to refer, see infra notes 329-36 and accompanying
text.
291. D. MEISELMAN, supra note 86, at 26 (many errors are due to carelessness rather
than lack of knowledge).
292. PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 23, at 6.
293. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 12 at 33 (proper file organization is crucial
in preventing many errors which result in malpractice claims).
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would be the result of an attorney's location. 294
Even though the legal profession as a whole in North Dakota
is a very homogeneous group and while only a small percentage of
the lawyers actually practice in a truly rural setting, it may be pos-
sible that rural lawyers do at times suffer a significant disadvantage
due to their location. Whenever a group of persons are catego-
rized together by an external characteristic that they share,
295problems can occur due to over or underinclusiveness. A geo-
graphical limitation is a very crude tool to measure a standard of
care. A geographical limitation may be overinclusive if attorneys
that need protection from an unreasonable standard do not qualify
because the community they practice in is populated with special-
ists. Geographical limitations may be underinclusive if individuals
that have been injured by malpractice have no recourse because
no attorney in the community is qualified to handle the particular
task. Special care must be taken in a state like North Dakota,
where the groups to be classified (rural lawyers and urban lawyers)
are very similar to each other or where characteristics overlap, so
that the unfairness of over or underinclusiveness can be avoided.
D. NORTH DAKOTA'S CURRENT STANDARD OF CARE
The current standard of care for lawyers in North Dakota was
adopted in 1971 by the supreme court in Feil v. Wishek.296 .In
Feil, an attorney failed to advise his clients that a contract for the
sale of furniture, fixtures, and merchandise should be filed with the
registrar of deed to create a lien on the goods.297 The purchasing
party filed for bankruptcy and the plaintiffs were left with the sta-
tus of general creditors.298  The defendant attorney contended
294. Administrative errors are often the result of carelessness, and if the error is
obvious, courts may treat the issue of negligence as a question of law. See Martinson Bros. v.
Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 872 (N.D. 1985) (whether an attorney breached a professional
duty is ordinarily a question of fact, but where reasonable minds cannot differ, the question
is treated as one of law); Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., 311 N.W.2d 175, 181
(N.D. 1981) (same).
295. See Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 344-53 (1949). The authors state that the essence of equal protection is that "those
similarly situated be similarly treated." Id. at 345. They also note that "[a] reasonable
classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none who are not." Id.
Finally, the authors conclude that the reasonableness of a classification depends upon the
relation between the class that the statute intends to affect and the class which the statute
actually affects. Id. at 347. According to the authors, if the rule does not relate well to the
problem group, it is either overinclusive or underinclusive, or both. Id. at 344-53.
Therefore, the authors suggest that an unreasonable classification may be a source of
injustice. Id.
296. 193 N.W.2d 218, 225 (N.D. 1971).
297. Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 219-20 (N.D. 1971).
298. Id. at 220.
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that such advice would have been premature because the parties
did not provide him with a list of the property for attachment to
the agreement.299 The North Dakota Supreme Court announced
the standard of care, holding:
[T]he attorney in the instant case, failed to exercise that
degree of care commonly possessed and exercised by
other reasonable, careful and prudent lawyers of this
State, in not advising his clients that the agreement
should be filed in the appropriate office.3 °°
Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court applied a geographi-
cal limitation to the standard of care, that limitation being the
state, thereby subjecting all lawyers within the state to the same
standard of care. °
The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted this standard of
care for lawyers from a Washington case, Cook, Flanagan & Berst
v. Clausing.3 0 2  The Washington Supreme Court quoted the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,30 3 which includes a general stan-
dard requiring a professional to "exercise the skill and knowledge
normally possessed by members of that profession. ' 30 4  The
Restatement language quoted by the court in Cook also included
the geographical element, "in similar communities.-30 The
Washington court discounted this locality language, holding that
an attorney must perform his professional services with that
degree of skill, care, and knowledge, commonly possessed and
exercised by reasonable and prudent lawyers in the jurisdiction. 0
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Feil therefore apparently
adopted this version of the standard of care from the Washington
299. Id. at 223.
300. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). The court quoted a New Jersey case with approval.
Id. at 224; see McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 132 A. 102 (1926). In McCullough,
the court stated a general standard of care, holding an attorney to "reasonable knowledge
and skill ordinarily possessed by other members of his profession." Feil, 193 N.W.2d at 224
(quoting McCullough, 102 N.J.L. at 384, 132 A. at 103). The Feil court also quoted a
California case with approval which stated that an attorney will be held liable for want of
such skill and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill commonly possess. Fell, 193 N.W.2d at
225; see Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, -, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 865-66 (1961).
301. Fell, 193 N.W.2d at 225.
302. 73 Wash. 2d 393, 438 P.2d 865 (1968).
303. Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausin, 73 Wash. 2d 393, -, 438 P.2d 865, 866 (1968);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
304. Cook, 73 Wash. 2d -, 438 P.2d at 866 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1965)).
305. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965)).
306. Id. at -, 438 P.2d at 866-67. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, at 336
("Supreme Court of Washington reasoned that all attorneys within its jurisdiction are




In 1981, the North Dakota Supreme Court appeared to alter
the statewide locality standard of care in Sheets v. Letnes, Mar-
shall & Fiedler, Ltd.3 °8 In Sheets, the court stated that the stan-
dard of care for lawyers was "that degree of skill, care, diligence
and knowledge as is ordinarily possessed by members of the legal
profession in good standing in similar communities."'30 9 Although
the court cited Feil, it apparently adopted the standard in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A which utilizes the "similar
communities" language, rather than applying the previous "in the
state" language of Feil.310 The court in Sheets did not, however,
make the community an issue, so perhaps this deviation was
merely an oversight. On the other hand, it may be that the court
did not want to set an inflexible standard, and therefore refused to
strictly adhere to one standard for all cases.
Although the addition of a similar localities element to the
standard of care for lawyers alleviates problems that weakened the
basic locality rule (i.e., the "conspiracy of silence" and shortage of
experts), it is still a crude method to distinguish the level of
resources that are available to a particular lawyer. This is the case
since lawyers of different skill levels may practice within the same
community. Therefore, in North Dakota, where the majority of
the lawyers are general practitioners, regardless of whether they
practice in a rural or urban locality, the similar communities stan-
dard would not be useful to distinguish levels of resources and
opportunities.
Furthermore, as illustrated in Cook v. Irion, the similar locali-
ties element does not account for specific differences in the local
307. See Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 224-25 (N.D. 1971). The court in Feil stated
no other rationale for adopting the "in the state" rule. Id.
308. 311 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D. 1981).
309. Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., 311 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D. 1981)
(emphasis added). In Sheets, the client alleged that the defendant law firm had negligently
failed to commence a wrongful death action within two years following the death of her
husband. Id. at 177. The district court judge granted the plaintiff summary judgment as a
matter of law on the issue of liability for legal malpractice. Id. The North Dakota Supreme
Court held:
The degree of uncertainty as to the applicable statute of limitations coupled with
the requirement that an attorney exercise the degree of skill and care ordinarily
exercised by attorneys under similar circumstances requires a factual
determination to ascertain whether or not there was a violation of that standard
of care.
Id. at 181 (emphasis added). The supreme court also found that different inferences could
be drawn from the facts in favor of the defendant and therefore, reversed the summary
judgment. Id. The fact that the supreme court mentioned a third variation on the standard
of care indicates that in this case, geographical factors were irrelevant. See id.
310. Feil, 193 N.W.2d at 225; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
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rules and customs that may be relevant to establishing whether a
lawyer's conduct was reasonable.3 1' Under the North Dakota
Rules of Court, trial courts are not given discretion to customize
their local rules.31 2 Nevertheless, in contravention of the official
rules, several courts do have requirements for motion practice par-
ticular to their respective districts. 3  The result is a reduction in
uniformity among the districts throughout the state. In addition,
social scientists recognize that there is a cultural dichotomy
between eastern and western North Dakota.31 4 Therefore, the
"similar localities" element may not take into account a lawyer's
conduct in relation to such peculiarities, and experts drawn from
similar localities may not be qualified to testify as to the appropri-
ate standard of care in that specific locality.
31 5
In a 1985 case, Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum,31 6 the North
Dakota Supreme Court restated its original holding in Fel v.
Wishek that the standard of care is measured by that degree of
skill and care exercised by a reasonable and prudent lawyer within
the state.31 7 The court also cited Sheets without distinguishing or
even reiterating the holding in Sheets that the standard of care
was to be measured by the skill and care possessed by members of
the legal profession in similar communities.318 Furthermore, the
court in Martinson placed significant weight on the particular cir-
cumstances of the case, as the court stated:
311. See Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). For a discussion of
Cook, see supra notes 136-56 and accompanying text.
312. See NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF COURT Rule 1.1 (1988) (rules of court apply to all
courts of this state).
313. Interview with Larry Kraft, Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School
of Law (March 10, 1988).
314. T. PEDELISKI, R. KWEIT, M.G. KWEIT, & L. OMDAHL, CLEAVAGES ON RECENT
BALLOT MEASURES: THE Two STATES OF NORTH DAKOTA? 9-11 (North Dakota Bureau of
Governmental Affairs S.R. 81 # 1987) (east and west serves as a base for diverging political
cultures in North Dakota).
315. For a discussion of the problems associated with expert testimony and the "similar
localities" standard, see supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
316. 359 N.W.2d 865 (N.D. 1985).
317. Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 872 (N.D. 1985); Feil v. Wishek, 193
N.W.2d 218, 225 (N.D. 1971). In Martinson, the client sued the defendant attorney for
negligence in redrafting a contract for the sale of farmland and equipment, failure to assert
a nonseverability defense in a foreclosure action, failure to document the agreement, and
failure to consult the clients upon discovering discrepancies between two financial
statements. Martinson Bros., 359 N.w.2d at 872. The trial was before the district court
judge with expert testimony having been presented by both parties. Id. at 871. The trial
judge held that the "[defendant's] representation of the [plaintiffs] did not fall below the
standard of performance exercised by reasonable, careful, and prudent lawyers in the
practice of law in the state of North Dakota." Id. Since the district court's judgment was
upheld on appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court appears to have reverted to the
standard first announced in Feil. Id.; see Feil 193 N.W.2d at 225.
318. Id.; see Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., 313 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D.
1981).
It appears that both parties were anxious to consummate
the purchase agreement and wished to have the agree-
ment expedited. Under these circumstances, we cannot
say that the trial court erred in finding that Hjellum did
not negligently redraft the agreement....
Having carefully reviewed the record, we cannot
conclude that the trial court's finding that Hjellum acted
reasonably under the particular circumstances of this case
is clearly erroneous.3 19
Since the pronouncement of the standard of care in Feil v. Wishek,
the North Dakota Supreme Court has, at times, included three dif-
ferent limiting elements within its formula. Therefore, it is
unclear where the North Dakota court stands on the locality rule
issue. It may be that the court does not consider such elements as
determinative issues of law. On the other hand, the court may
favor flexibility. Most likely, the above quoted language may be
merely an example of good legal reasoning and the process of
applying the general rule to all pertinent facts. The adoption of a
more explicit standard of care by the North Dakota Supreme
Court, one which would call for the degree of skill and care exer-
cised by a reasonable and prudent lawyer in the state under the
particular circumstances, would offer both uniformity and flexibil-
ity in addressing legal malpractice actions.
E. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN "IN-THE-STATE" STANDARD
The "in-the-state" standard provides a uniform yardstick by
which to measure a lawyer's performance. This standard was set
forth in the North Dakota case, Feil v. Wishek, which provided
that all lawyers must "exercise that degree of care commonly pos-
sessed and exercised by other reasonable, careful and prudent law-
yers of this State .... ,,320 By making the state the locality of
practice, this standard ought to prevent the importation of expert
witnesses from outside of North Dakota. 321 In certain instances, it
would be unfair to subject North Dakota lawyers to the same stan-
dard of care to which California or New York lawyers are held
because those states are primarily metropolitan. In the states that
are largely urban, there are a greater number of large firms, and
319. Martinson Bros., 359 N.W.2d at 873, 875 (emphasis added).
320. Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 225 (N.D. 1971).
321. For a discussion of the use of expert testimony with the "in the state or
jurisdiction" variation, see supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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consequently, there is more opportunity to speciaize.322 As of
1985 in North Dakota, however, the largest firm has no more than
twenty lawyers, whereas in large cities, firms of over 100 lawyers
are not uncommon.323 Therefore, since North Dakota is a rural
state where the majority of the lawyers are general practitioners, a
standard of care that is limited to the state boundaries serves to
protect North Dakota lawyers from the imposition of an unreason-
ably high standard of care.
Conversely, the "in-the-state" standard has been criticized as
promoting an unacceptably low standard of care within a state's
boundaries.3 24 It is plausible that no lawyers in a particular state
are competent to work in certain areas of the law, such as securi-
ties regulation, patent, or admiralty law. Therefore, the customary
level of skill within a given state in those areas of law may be unac-
ceptably low.
In Feil, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted the "in-the-
state" element of the standard of care from Cook, a case decided
by the Washington Supreme Court. 32' The Washington Supreme
Court applied the "in-the-state" standard, reasoning that the quali-
fications for the practice of law were the same throughout the
state and did not significantly differ among the various communi-
ties. 26 Therefore, the Washington court held that all lawyers in
the state should be held to the same standard of care.327 If this
standard is read literally, a lawyer practicing in an isolated rural
community would have to find means other than a locality rule to
protect him or herself from malpractice claims arising from a lack
of resources. The North Dakota Supreme Court has declined to
place a strict interpretation on the "in-the-state" element of stan-
dard of care for lawyers which would call for absolute uniformity.
In the alternative, the North Dakota Supreme Court has consid-
ered the circumstances of the particular case to allow for some
flexibility.328 It is plausible that the North Dakota Supreme Court,
322. Conpare 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 249, at 112 (zero percent of firms in
North Dakota have over 20 lawyers) with THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 2-26 (1984) (listing the
200 largest law firms in the U.S.).
323. Cornpare 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 249, at 112 (zero percent of firms in
North Dakota have over 20 lawyers) with THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC 2-26 (1984) (listing the
200 largest law firms in the U.S.).
324. Note, supra note 14, at 406.
325. Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 224-25 (N.D. 1971); see Cook, Flanagan & Berst
v. Clausin, 73 Wash. 2d 393, __, 438 P.2d 865, 866 (1968).
326. Cook, 73 Wash. 2d at __, 438 P.2d at 866.
327. Id. at __, 438 P.2d at 866.
328. See Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 873, 875 (N.D. 1985) (court
utilized the "in-the-state" rule, but considered the circumstances of the transaction when
justifying the result); Sheets v. Letnes, Marshall & Fiedler, Ltd., 311 N.W.2d 175, 180-81
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if faced with a fact pattern where the defendant was a rural law-
yer, would consider locality of practice or lack of resources as cir-
cumstances which might vary the standard of care.
If the standard of care does not vary according to the facts of
each case, an attorney faced with a difficult case may have to refer
it to, or associate with, an attorney in a better position to handle
the case. 329 There are several problems with relying on referrals,
association, or consultation to enhance competence in the legal
profession. First, a lawyer cannot make a living if he or she has to
hire an expert or pass the problem on to another attorney.33 ° Sec-
ond, in rural areas, there simply may not be other attorneys avail-
able who are more competent on the given subject matter.331
Finally, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility discourages
referrals by inhibiting fee splitting.3 32  The Model Code only
allows the division of fees in proportion to the services performed
and responsibility assumed by each attorney.333 This problem has
been alleviated somewhat in states that have adopted the Model
Rules334 which allows for the fees to be divided, with the consent
of the client, in any way the associating attorneys like as long as
each attorney assumes joint responsibility for the services.335
Some states have alleviated this problem by implementing novel
approaches that enhance referrals and consultation with other
336attorneys.
(N.D. 1981) (court stated "'similar communities" rule, but considered the uncertainty of
judicial precedent as a circumstance to vary the standard of care).
329. Cf. Walter, When a Case Seems Out of our League, 1 COMPLEAT LAWYER 24
(Winter 1984). Both the Model Code and Model Rules contain a duty to refer a case to a
lawyer who is more competent when the practitioner feels insecure about his or her ability.
MODEL CODE, supra note 20, DR 6-101 (AXI); MODEL RULES, supra note 20, Rule 1.1
comment. For the language from the Model provisions see supra note 20; see also, Home v.
Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 414, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720 (1979) (general practitioner has
a duty to refer a client to a specialist if, under the circumstances, it would be reasonable and
prudent to do so).
330. TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 34 (attorneys
are reluctant to limit their practice because they need the money).
331. J. ELWELL, supra note 41, at 22-23 (in rural areas, professionals may have to act in
an area of expertise in which they are not experienced, or the client will have to go without
services completely).
332. TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, supra note 187, at 34; MODEL
CODE, supra note 20, DR 2-107(A).
333. TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER supra note 187, at 35; MODEL
CODE, supra note 20, DR 2-107(A).
334. For a list of the states which have adopted the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, see supra note 27.
335. TASK FORCE ON THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER supra note 187, at 34-35; see
MODEL RULES, supra note 20, Rule 1.5(e).
336. E.g., Branch, Use Your Lawyer-to-Lawyer Directory, 57 Wis. B. BULL. 11 (Sept.
1984). The author notes:
One readily available tool to reduce malpractice losses is the State Bar
Lawyer-to-Lawyer Directory, which was published in the July 1983 Wisconsin
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:661
Another means for a rural lawyer to enhance his or her com-
petence is to conduct sufficient research. Although this may be
somewhat costly, modern methods such as computer databases
serve to make the process of learning new law more efficient.
337
Like the option of referring a case, research has also been charac-
terized as a duty that a lawyer must perform if he or she is going to
take the case.338
Today there are various resources available to a North Dakota
attorney at a relatively low cost. For instance, the University of
North Dakota School of Law, in cooperation with the State Bar
Association of North Dakota, offers "Services for Attorneys" which
includes: photocopying requested cases, computer-assisted
searches, book loans, audio and video cassette loans, a Lexis com-
puter research co-op, and on-call research by law students.33 9 In
addition, to assure continued competence, each attorney in North
Dakota must complete 45 hours of Continuing Legal Education
(CLE) course work every three years.340 Therefore, to maintain a
valid license to practice law, a North Dakota attorney must move
Bar Bulletin. While malpractice cause of loss analysis is still in its infancy, it is
clear that lawyers make more mistakes, errors and omissions.when practicing in
an unfamiliar area of law.
If consulted about a matter outside your own prior experience, ask another
lawyer about it. That is what lawyers in law firms - large and small - do. It
saves time and points the lawyer in the right direction, making him or her aware
of the key issues. If you don't practice in a firm or no other lawyer in your firm
has experience or "expertise" in the area of law with which you are dealing, use
your Lawyer-to-Lawyer Directory. It costs you no more than the cost of a
telephone call, and it just might save you money and your client from being
damaged by an error or omission.
Id.
337. Combs, Moorhead & Donahue, Get on Track with On- Line Research, 3
COMPLEAT LAWYER 25 (Spring 1986).
338. See Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 415, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 721 (1979)
(with respect to an unsettled area of the law, an attorney assumes an obligation to his client
to undertake reasonable research); Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 358-59, 530 P.2d 589,
596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621,627 (1975) (attorney assumes an obligation to his client to undertake
reasonable research); Bowen v. Arnold, 380 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (lawyer
has a duty to the client to inform himself completely and accurately); Procanik v. Cillo, 206
N.J. Super. 270, -, 502 A.2d 94, 102 (1985) (attorneys are absolutely responsible for
researching case law decisions as well as advance sheets); O'Connell, Legal Malpractice:
Does the Lawyer Have a Duty to Use Computerized Research?, 35 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 77,
89-92 (1984-85) (reasonable attorney would use computerized research).
339. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA SCHOOL OF LAW/STATE BAR ASSOCIATION OF
NORTH DAKOTA, SERVICES FOR ATrORNEYS (June 1986).
340. NORTH DAKOTA COURT RULES 806 (1988); see also LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra
note 2, at 21:3001-08 (21 states have mandatory CLE for active members of the bar:
Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming); ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL
COMPETENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY SINCE ARDEN HOUSE II 1-5 (1984).
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to improve his or her skills, theoretically maintaining the level of
skill possessed at the time the bar examination was first passed.
Realistically, even with the methods available for increasing
one's competency as described above, some legal problems are not
successfully disposed of without a considerable degree of experi-
ence and support.3 4 1 Therefore, the urban practitioner in a large
firm, with the ability to limit his or her practice, will necessarily
perform at a higher level of competency in certain areas of the
law.342 Working in a large firm not only allows an attorney the
opportunity to specialize, but also allows the pooling of capital to
develop a larger library and the luxury of a support staff.3 43 The
"in-the-state" standard, by itself, does not distinguish between the
large firm specialist and the rural general practitioner. Therefore,
it may be necessary to combine an additional standard of care limi-
tation with the "in-the-state" standard to give the standard of care
for lawyers the flexibility necessary to account for differences in
available resources.
F. SUGGESTIONS FOR MODIFICATION
If interpreted strictly, the "in-the-state" element of the stan-
dard of care is very inflexible. This inflexibility may be mitigated
by the addition of an element which allows for different skill levels
and available resources. In 1979, the Washington Supreme Court
added a higher standard of care for specialists to its "in-the-state"
standard. 44 Lawyers in Washington are held to "that degree of
care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exer-
cised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice
of law in th[e] jurisdiction; 3 45 however, "one who holds himself
out as specializing and as possessing greater than ordinary knowl-
edge and skill in a particular field, will be held to the standard of
341. Chaplin, supra note 212, at 311-12. The author notes in pertinent part:
It is becoming more and more common for lawyers to affiliate themselves in
larger and larger law partnerships organized along.fairly rigid departmental
lines such as litigation, tax, estate planning and probate, corporate, and real
estate. There is simply too much information and practical experience to be
obtained in each of these areas to make it efficient, let alone cost-effective, for a
lawyer to handle competently more than the most nundane problems in more
than a very few areas of practice at any given time.
Id. (emphasis added).
342. See id.
343. See id. at 311-12.
344. Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wash. 2d 854, _, 601 P.2d 1279, 1283 (1979) (one who holds
himself out as specialist in a particular field of law will be held to standard of performance of
those who hold themselves out as specialists in that area).
345. Walker, 92 Wash. 2d at -, 601 P.2d at 1282 (quoting Cook, Flanagan & Berst v.
Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968)).
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performance of those who hold themselves out as specialists in that
area." 4 6 The combination of the two rules serves to protect the
rural lawyer, most likely a general practitioner, from the effect of
being compared to a group that includes specialists. 47 This combi-
nation also serves to protect the public since it holds those who
profess to be specialists to a standard commensurate to their prom-
ised abilities. Furthermore, this combination continues to foster
statewide uniformity and also provides an element of flexibility
that is necessary to serve the best interests of the legal profession
and society.
The combination of North Dakota's "in-the-state" element
with an "under the circumstances" element included in the gen-
eral standard of care for lawyers would have the same effect as a
higher standard for specialists because specialization is a circum-
stance relevant to the standard of care.348 Under this formulation,
North Dakota lawyers would have to exercise that degree of skill
and care commonly possessed and exercised by reasonable and
prudent lawyers in the state under the given circumstances. The
advantage of this formulation is that it is infinitely flexible because
"circumstances" may include any factor relevant to the proper
practice of law. The disadvantage of this version of a standard of
care is that it provides less specific guidance to the trial court.
Nevertheless, combining either a higher standard for specialists or
including an "under the circumstances" element with the "in-the-
state" element would provide a very workable and fair standard of
care for lawyers which would serve the best interests of both the
public and the legal profession in North Dakota.
V. CONCLUSION
As long as people need lawyers and lawyers practice law,
there are going to be instances where the lawyer fails to provide
the quality of services that society demands. Courts seek to protect
society and deter wrongdoing by imposing liability on the party at
fault. In order to measure a lawyer's conduct, courts devise stan-
346. Id. at -, 601 P.2d at 1283.
347. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 5, § 254, 334. The authors note:
The ability of the practitioner and the minimum knowledge required should not
vary with geography. The rural practitioner should not be less careful, less able
or less skillful than the urban attorney .... This is not to say that the practitioner
from a small community, who of necessity must generalize his practice, is to be
compared with the city attorney who limits his practice to the subject matter of
the dispute.
348. Id., § 254, at 337.
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dards of care which define the minimum level of acceptable serv-
ices. Geographical elements such as the "locality rule" were
devised to protect practitioners from liability when the true cause
of injury was not a lack of care, but rather factors beyond the law-
yer's control. Geographical elements included in the standard of
care also protect society by requiring that a lawyer be familiar
with the circumstances unique to his or her locality of practice and
holding him or her to the level of care reasonably achievable
under the circumstances.
There are two basic flaws in the basic locality rule presump-
tion. First, it may have the effect of lowering the standard of care
to an unacceptable level in a small town or it may raise the stan-
dard of care to an unattainable level in metropolitan areas where
specialization is the norm.349 Second, it may create a "conspiracy
of silence" because lawyers in the same community are often
unwilling to provide the necessary expert testimony to define
what a reasonable and prudent lawyer would have done in that
particular situation.350
One alternative to the locality rule is to add the "under the
circumstances" element to a general standard of care. This stan-
dard is like the "reasonable man" standard in an ordinary negli-
gence case in that it requires a lawyer to exercise a reasonable
degree of care under the circumstances in which he or she must
act. This provision provides a high degree of flexibility to the par-
ties and the court in fashioning a standard that is fair to both the
attorney and the client. The "under the circumstances" standard
may be too general, however, since it provides trial courts with
very little guidance. Furthermore, it provides no protection
against the importation of foreign experts who may testify to a
standard of care to which a North Dakota attorney is not familiar.
Finally, proper legal reasoning by counsel for the parties and the
court may always take into consideration the relevant facts and
apply them to the law, regardless of a specified element.
To avoid these problems and yet still maintain a level of pro-
tection for rural or general practitioners, some courts, such as the
North Dakota Supreme Court, have expanded the geographical
limitations within the standard of care to the boundaries of the
state. This evolution was helpful in keeping experts' fees down
349. For a discussion of the effect of the locality rule on the general practitioner, see
supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
350. For a discussion of the "'conspiracy of silence" associated with expert testimony,
see supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
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and allowing for the special nature of the profession in the state,
but it does not help the rural lawyer who must make a living and
serve the public under sometimes less than ideal conditions.
The inflexibility of the "in-the-state" standard may be miti-
gated by holding those who represent themselves to be "special-
ists" to a higher standard of care. 3 1 Because a rural lawyer is
usually a general practitioner and an urban lawyer is more likely
to be a specialist, this combination serves to protect the rural law-
yer from an unrealistic standard and protects the public from
backwater pools of incompetence. This standard can be made
even more specific by adding a duty to research and a duty to refer
to the standard of care. These duties demand that the lawyer
think through each case and make a reasonable decision that is in
the best interests of the client. This combination serves 'the best
interests of both the public and the profession in North Dakota by
providing a uniform standard for a homogeneous legal community
and yet taking into consideration the modern reality of
specialization.
Dwain E. Fagerlund
351. Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wash. 2d 854, __, 601 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (1979).
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